INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 27, 1984

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control

SCNAC-98-2-6

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

39-622 O WASHINGTON : 1984

H961-20

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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27, 1984

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Charles B. Rangel (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Charles B. Rangel, Frank Guarini, Solomon P. Ortiz, and Benjamin A. Gilman.

Staff present: John T. Cusack, chief of staff; Richard B. Lowe III, chief counsel; Elliott A. Brown, minority staff director; Edward H. Jurith, counsel; George Gilbert, counsel; Michael J. Kelley, counsel; Marc Lippman, counsel; James W. Lawrence, minority professional staff; Catherine H. Shaw minority professional staff; Karen E. Watson, professional staff; Julie Croft, intern; Leecia Eve, intern; and Jeff Isaacs, intern.

Mr. RANGEL. The select committee hearing will come to order.

Today the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control will continue its examination of the administration's performance in the area of international narcotics control.

We will limit our inquiry and analysis to the methods by which the U.S. Department of State and the Agency for International Development will seek to implement the conclusions and recommendations made in the committee's report of its study missions to Latin America and Jamaica in August of 1983 and to Asia and Italy in January of this year. This report was issued by the select committee last week.

It is my sad duty to report that we are unequivocally losing the effort overseas to control the illicit production and trafficking of narcotics which are so tragically affecting the United States.

It is the perception of this committee, reiterated by the recently released study mission report, that our failure in bringing these illicit narcotics under control has been in part one of diplomacy. Not only have we failed to progress or hold the status quo in international narcotics control, but we have retrogressed enormously in the past 5 years.

All of the indicators lead to the inescapable conclusion that drugs are available in the United States in amounts unprecedented in our history. The illegal market is flooded with narcotics produced abroad, ironically, by many nations friendly to the United States.

There are in this country an estimated 500,000 active heroin addicts. The Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and Southwest border regions

of the Nation are experiencing a dramatic increase in heroin addiction triggered by the commensurate increased availability of heroin from Southwest Asia as well as from the infamous Golden Triangle area of Southeast Asia. We are hearing, too, of heroin again coming across the Mexican border. This is by staff. I never heard when it was not coming across the Mexican border.

We have heard all too often, just in the past year, in the course of meetings and hearings that this committee has held throughout the country, how there is a cocaine glut on the market.

In 1983, it was estimated that about 60 tons of cocaine entered this country, a dramatic increase from the estimated 25 tons reported available here just 4 years ago in 1980.

About 75 percent of the cocaine affecting the United States is clandestinely manufactured in Colombia from coca paste smuggled from Peru and Bolivia where it is produced. Since 1981, Colombia has had online its own coca leaf production which also contributes a share to the traffic of cocaine directed to the United States.

An estimated 15,000 to 60,000 tons of marijuana is believed to be entering the United States from abroad to augment an estimated 2,000 tons of domestic marijuana. While some reports indicate that the use of marijuana among the Nation's high school seniors is leveling off, or is even declining slightly, there remain an estimated 25 million users of marijuana in the United States. The numbers are simply staggering.

In large measure, the failure of our international initiatives to control the production of narcotics in the source countries, as well as the trafficking of these dangerous substances worldwide, emanates from the lack of priority the State Department attaches to international narcotics control.

The Department of State is responsible for ensuring that the U.S. Government implements its obligations under the International Narcotic and Psychotropic Conventions and that other governments comply with their obligations, particularly those where an illicit cultivation, manufacturing, or trafficking problem may exist and thereby threaten the United States.

Let me pause here, since I'm not testifying, to welcome Assistant Secretary of State Dominick DiCarlo of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters and Frank Kimball, counselor to the Agency for International Development.

For the most part, the remainder of my opening statement was sent to you in letters dated April 12 and June 14, and the Congress and the committee want to thank you for the thoroughness of your response, which we have received.

In addition to this, the committee would like to state for the record the pleasure that we have had in working with you, Assistant Secretary, in what has been and still is an uphill struggle in connection with the Congress and the people of the United States in order to curtail the spread of these poisonous drugs.

No one has worked harder, visited more countries, talked with more people, and given up more time from your family and friends and communities than you have in illustrating the deep-seated concern that this Nation has and in having the courage to speak up to those countries, no matter how friendly they have been in other areas, to explain to them how important it is to the United States.

I do hope that the accusations that I and this committee make or the criticisms that we make, we want to make it abundantly clear that we all sincerely believe, individually and collectively, liberal and conservative, Republican and Democrat, that you have done the best that you could with the tools that you had to work with, and we do hope that the days that you spend on your forthcoming appointment to the Federal bench would be less hectic and you have an opportunity to reflect on the laurels and the contributions that you made to the people of the United States.

Having said that, we ought to get back to where we are, and I welcome your testimony. Since we have it, you might feel free to testify either by reading your statement, or recognizing that your full statement will appear in the record anyway, you might want to highlight it, and we could spend more time with questions.

Welcome once again to the committee, and this will probably be your last official meeting with us, but we are certain that we will be calling upon you from time to time to get the benefit of your expertise.

[Mr. Rangel's opening statement appears on p. 29.]

TESTIMONY OF DOMINICK L. DiCARLO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. ACCOMPANIED BY JON THOMAS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS; AND FRANK B. KIMBALL, COUNSELOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. DiCARLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I begin, I would like just to introduce Mr. Jon Thomas, my Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, who is seated to my right.

I would just like to say preliminarily that I thank you for the kind words expressed by you. I would like to also point out, during the reading of my testimony, that I was not instructed to respond to the report of the committee at the time we were asked to appear before you here, but I knew that perhaps the issue might be raised, and I incorporated comments on it.

While not agreeing or disagreeing necessarily with the committee's report in the statement, perhaps some of my opinions about the report can be gleaned from my statement.

Mr. RANGEL. Very good.

Mr. DiCARLO. I've also submitted for the record the answers to the 45 questions that were presented to us.

Mr. RANGEL. Without objection——

Mr. DiCARLO. I apologize for not having them here sooner, but we received them at a rather late date. The questions were quite good, quite penetrating, and it took some time to prepare.

Mr. RANGEL. Without objection, both the questions and the answers submitted by your office will appear in the record.

Mr. DiCARLO. Thank you, sir.

[The questions and answers appear on p. 36.]

Mr. DiCARLO. Mr. Chairman, our strategy for international narcotics control was defined in the early months of this administration by the testimony of Under Secretary Stoessel before the House

Foreign Affairs Committee. Today, I will review key elements of that strategy and discuss progress we have made through our diplomatic initiatives and program efforts.

The Department advised the Congress we would give priority to: Increased assistance from, and political involvement by, the international community; greater acceptance by producer and transit countries of their national and international responsibilities under treaties; greater awareness by source and donor nations that drug abuse and drug trafficking are not just problems of the United States; expansion of crop control and interdiction programs in source countries; and increased linkage between narcotics-related economic assistance and production controls.

We have made considerable progress toward these goals.

The Department also testified in the early months of this administration on the conditions precedent which influence the effectiveness of control programs, including the need for governments to have control of growing areas and the political will to eliminate production.

There is a fundamental truth about U.S. narcotics control efforts: to achieve sustained reductions in the availability of illicit narcotics coming into the United States, we must bring narcotics production under control in all key growing areas simultaneously.

We said then we had a problem of excessive production, which continues today. We also have problems of insurgent control of growing areas, organized and increasingly violent opposition by traffickers, local economies dependent upon narcotics production, and increasing local demand for narcotics for internal consumption.

We had no illusions then about the effort needed to contain this problem. We have no illusions now. We also know we are making progress.

The basic requirement we faced was to establish a truly international base for narcotics control, including new and expanded programs in more source countries and more extensive involvement by the international community.

Today, while the problems of narcotics production and trafficking are extensive, we believe the United States, in cooperation with other nations, has made progress in laying that foundation for simultaneous control programs and that we have been successful in broadening the scope of international involvement.

Given your study missions and knowledge of the special problems we face, I am sure the committee concurs that our diplomatic efforts and programs have come a long way in just a few years.

We note your shared belief that effective diplomacy is a key element to progress in international narcotics control. It has been through our bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts that we have achieved many of our objectives.

These diplomatic efforts have involved the President, the Secretary, and other ranking U.S. officials. Recently, these efforts have been joined by the diplomatic activities of other nations, whose strong commitment is critical to achieving our objectives in international narcotics control. Achieving this broader international involvement was among our key objectives.

In addition to the valuable liaison with ministries of health, interior, and justice, we have engaged the foreign ministries of other developed nations in discussions of narcotics control and are now seeing narcotics appropriately emphasized as a matter of foreign policy, which was another of our earliest diplomatic objectives.

One consequence of our diplomatic and program efforts, which include not only our activities but the information programs of the U.S. Information Agency, is that drug abuse is no longer seen primarily as a U.S. problem.

There is increased awareness in other countries of the internal damage which drug abuse and drug trafficking are causing, including rampant drug abuse among their youth, undermining of their economies, corruption, increasing violence, murder, and other crimes, and links between narcotics traffickers, terrorists, and political insurgents.

In our communications with the governments and peoples of source nations, we have emphasized that drug abuse is a common burden, and this emerging awareness of that reality is a principal factor in our obtaining new and enhanced agreements on crop control. These factors have also led to increased commitments by the governments of developed nations to curb production and trafficking.

A particular objective has been increased involvement by the U.N. organizations in narcotics control and the expansion of multilateral programs through U.N. agencies.

Now the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control is prepared to support coca control programs in South America, thanks in part to a 5-year $40 million donation from the Government of Italy. The fund will also be administering a new Special Development and Enforcement Program in Pakistan which is also attracting major donor support.

While seeking increased involvement by the international community and organizations, we have also secured new bilateral agreements and enhanced existing programs.

We are pleased that the committee's report acknowledges the significant progress which has been made in key source countries. In the last 3 years, we have entered into major new agreements with Pakistan, Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia.

Your report comments favorably on many of the accomplishments, including opium crop reduction in Pakistan, the suppression of narcotics production activities in Thailand, and the continuing commitment by the Government of Mexico to crop control.

We note the acknowledgments of the improved Colombian program in the statements by Chairman Rangel, Mr. Gilman, and others in support of the resolution passed unanimously in both Houses in May which noted the Colombians' increased activity and urged an eradication program.

The progress which you and other Members applauded continues. Arrests and raids on cocaine laboratories have increased, and the Government has announced a new eradication program.

It is important to an understanding of the Colombian program to recognize that the Government had been escalating its activities over the last 3 years, and especially in the last year, as evidenced

by the March raid at Tranquilandia which resulted in the seizure of 10 metric tons of cocaine and cocaine base.

Much of the leadership and planning had been provided by Minister of Justice Lara who was assassinated on April 30. The resolutions adopted by our Congress paid a justified tribute to Minister Lara. We are encouraged by the declaration of his successor that the campaign will continue.

The Colombian Government has recently announced a new coca and cannabis eradication program, which we applaud. The Colombians plan to use glyphosate to aerially eradicate cannabis. The government has also declared an expanded state of siege and, in addition to conducting other major raids, has announced it will honor U.S. requests for extradition.

Peru has agreed to reduce the cultivation of coca over 5 years to that amount required for traditional uses, and the plan is to take 4,000 hectares out of production this year in the upper Huallaga Valley.

State and the Agency for International Development have worked with the Peruvians to overcome problems that initially delayed this program, which combines crop control with integrated rural development.

We are also working with Peru and UNFDAC to provide a major narcotics-related development program in another growing area. We are also discussing the creation of additional mobile police units and coca control activities in areas which will not receive development assistance.

These activities are occurring against a backdrop of increasing violence spawned by cocaine traffickers, violence which seems to increase in Peru and elsewhere as programs expand and become more effective.

Bolivia agreed last August to a 5-year program to control coca cultivation in the Chapare region, and, while eradication and development assistance have been delayed by the necessity of establishing a police presence there, discussions are underway on control projects in the Yungas, where U.N. assistance is proposed, and other growing regions. The United States would again support the eradication efforts, including formation of additional mobile police units.

The priority which we assign to narcotics control was illustrated on June 1 and 2 by the meeting in Lima between department officials and our ambassadors to Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador to discuss narcotics control strategies and problems in the Andean region.

Your report praised the "national will and commitment" of the Government and people of Mexico to eradicate illicit crops and highlighted the impressive reduction in Mexican opium and cannabis cultivation from their high points in the middle 1970's when Mexican narcotics dominated the U S. heroin and marijuana markets.

There has been some increase in Mexican production in 1983, due in part to changes in growers' methods of operations—including selection of sites which are remote, frequently smaller, and more difficult to detect—and improved weather conditions.

We have provided, for testing in Mexico, a new type of agricultural spraying aircraft and improved spraying boom which are more flexible and more effective at both the higher altitudes where some new cultivation is occurring as well as at lower, traditional levels.

We have had continuing discussions with Mexican officials on improving narcotics eradication and verification efforts and are jointly planning an opium survey to improve assessments of production and control operations.

Our decision to support the acquisition and testing of a fixed-wing specialized spray aircraft and an improved spraying boom may pay dividends elsewhere. We are prepared to make this aircraft and boom available for spraying operations elsewhere in Central and South America and in Southeast Asia.

As your report noted, Thailand has conducted an effective campaign over the last several years to curb opium and heroin trafficking and to suppress heroin production along its border with Burma, losing numbers of its troops in the process.

There have been recent indications of Thai interest in eradication, which we continue to regard as a necessary component of a control strategy. The Thai have begun enforcing agreements under which we provide assistance to civilian-police-military command villages which agree to discontinue opium cultivation.

The Thai are revising a master plan for opium control, which was discussed at an informal meeting of major donor nations in February. The consensus among prospective donors was that there should be a clear linkage in this plan between the development assistance program and control objectives.

The United States also obtained consensus among donors, for the first time, that projects funded by the United Nations should be similarly linked. These understandings among donor nations fulfill another one of our important diplomatic objectives.

We have been discussing aerial eradication with the Burmese, who are willing to explore herbicidal spraying to eradicate the opium poppy. The United States has been providing the data the Burmese need to explore the feasibility of aerial eradication. We note that the Deputy Minister of Home and Religious Affairs will visit Washington next week and is including members of this committee among his calls.

Your report notes that "production of opium has dramatically decreased" in Pakistan and that progress has been achieved in crop control by the U.S.-assisted programs in the Malakand and Gadoon-Amazai areas. We also note your compliments on the special development and enforcement plan.

Pakistan has seen high-level cooperation between State, AID, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, and we believe that the increasing participation by European and other nations in the SDEP and other activities is a direct result of meetings of chiefs of mission which were initiated by our Ambassador.

Great Britain has pledged 1 million pounds, and Italy has pledged $5 million to this program. Saudi Arabia has also pledged support to Pakistani narcotics programs.

We have discussed with the Pakistanis our concern that reductions in crop cultivation should be matched by efforts to suppress

heroin laboratories, to interdict trafficking in opium and heroin, and to curb trafficking across the Afghan and Indian borders.

The priority which narcotics control has in our bilateral relations has been communicated by President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, and Attorney General Smith to top-ranking Pakistani officials and discussed in detail by the Joint Commission on Narcotics formed by our governments.

Rather than repeat facts and figures on activities in these and other countries, I will refer to the Department's international narcotics control strategy report and the mid-year update which will be submitted on August 1.

We have also provided answers to the questions you submitted in advance of this hearing. These reports and responses contain details on the narcotics control activities in about four dozen countries and include data on increased eradication and seizures in major source countries.

International narcotics control is a particularly complex problem, because it involves governments in diverse areas of the globe, governments whose people are affected differently by narcotics trafficking and by drug abuse, governments with different capabilities of dealing with the challenge.

Moreover, the international narcotics strategy is dependent upon the effectiveness with which foreign governments not only engage in drug law enforcement but are able to effect a rule of law throughout their territory.

Political will, central government control, and capability were key to the successes in Turkey and Mexico but are not currently operative in many narcotics source countries. Narcotics control in some countries is more than just a question of strategies and resources but has become a test of the political and economic stability of governments.

For all these reasons and more, we have advised the Congress on many occasions that achieving control is a long-term proposition.

We are certain that the committee recognizes the complexity of the challenge. There are no simple solutions. I am sure the select committee disagrees with those who offer simplistic answers to this problem.

Accomplishments have been made during recent years, but the production of illicit narcotics will not be controlled overnight or even in the short term.

Each of the several growing regions has sufficient capacity to supply the United States with heroin, cocaine, or marijuana. Again, to achieve substantial and lasting reductions in illicit drug availability, we must control production in all key growing regions simultaneously.

We, in cooperation with the Congress, have stimulated a more comprehensive response from other victim and donor nations, and by the international organizations. We have increased the awareness of the internal ravages of drug abuse among the governments and peoples of source and victim countries. We have promoted an expansion of crop control programs. We have achieved greater recognition by governments of their responsibilities under international treaties.

But we alone do not have the capacity nor the political opportunity to assure effective control programs in all growing regions. To achieve that capability, we must have a truly global effort, supported broadly throughout the international community. We and other nations must bolster these governments in their resolve to overcome this internal problem, assist their legitimate efforts to control production, and encourage an international response that assures worldwide containment of production and trafficking.

This is the agenda we have pursued. Through patient diplomacy, that strategy is showing some success.

That concludes my prepared testimony.

I just saw here in your news release a question which is: "He hopes Mr. DiCarlo will be able to tell the committee why narcotics source countries have increased rather than decreased in nations that are receiving U.S. assistance to curtail illicit crop production."

In answer to that question, sir, I'd like to point out, as does your own report, that that is not the case, that production has not increased in all source countries.

The efforts that we have made, together with those countries, together with the efforts made by Congress, together with the efforts made by others in the international community, have on occasion reduced production.

I point to one example. If I came to this committee 3 years ago, as I did, a major concern of the committee at that time would have been two countries, Pakistan and Colombia.

Let me point out to the committee that in its report it praises the dramatic reduction in Pakistan. So I will say at least to the extent of Pakistan, that question is not accurate. I will also say that countries in general which receive U.S. assistance do not, by that fact, have a resulting increase in production. I think that Pakistan is a perfect example—and your report so states—of diplomacy working.

Let's take other examples. The chairman might point out that we are now assisting Bolivia, but how come Bolivia has more coca than it had then? I think the answer is very simple.

The chairman knows, as does the committee, that when you went to Bolivia on August 12, 1983, the agreements had just been signed. I'm sure the committee does not expect the fact that we had started a program on August 11, or in 1983 signed agreements, that, ipso facto, there it goes, production is going to suddenly decrease. That would be simplistic.

It is not going to decrease, and I tell you now that even next year, with our assistance and with the programs continuing, production will not decrease, because, as you know, Mr. Chairman, in those agreements which you praised and the committee praised, first we have to maintain order in the area. We had to train the police force to go in; we did that.

The chairman knows, because I know you follow closely what is going on in Bolivia, the difficulties of inserting that police force in the growing area; they are not there yet, sir.

We are making every effort, as you know, and our Ambassador to Bolivia, Ambassador Corr, whom you have praised on many occasions, is making every diplomatic effort, and we have provided Ambassador Corr with the resources requested to do it.

If this committee believes that in the first year of a program—again I say a program start last year, with no reduction as yet—in Peru, with a program agreement signed in 1981, where you know the difficulties we encountered, you know the phase in—to expect a reduction this year or next year, I think, is expecting something that is not going to occur.

I was asked this question on many occasions in appearing before committees, "Mr. DiCarlo, if we give you the $52 million that you ask for"—which, by the way, we received $42 million of it—"if we give you that money that we asked for, can you tell us that the production of cocaine coming into the United States will be reduced next year?"

My answer to that is no, I cannot tell you that. I will not tell you that, because it will not happen that way.

But I can tell you though, as we start these programs, we are bringing the international community into them. They are long-term programs, and I would hope that we don't go out to the public with an indication that the success or failure of what we started in the last 2 years is going to bear fruit as to what is coming into the United States next year or the year after.

Mr. Chairman, you know in your visits to Pakistan, and your visits to Thailand, and your visits to Burma, of the problems we face. You know that there are estimated to be 1,800 tons of illicit opium produced throughout the world.

You know, Mr. Chairman, that we use an estimate of 45 tons of opium to produce 4.5 tons of heroin used here. Your report indicates perhaps addicts use more in the United States, and it might be 10 tons.

Even using that figure—which we don't agree with, but using it—it might be 100 tons of opium needed—I can't tell this committee that if our programs are amazingly successful in the next year and we reduce substantially the amount of opium produced, that that will show an impact on the U.S. market. That would be sheer hypocrisy for me to do so. This is a long-term proposition. We no longer have the conditions.

Some people look back to 1970 and 1972 when we had one or two markets producing the opium, where heroin was produced in laboratories in one or two locations, and an interruption in that system would interrupt substantially for considerable periods of time what comes in to the United States. It's no longer the case. Today opium is produced in many areas.

One of the failures of the 1970's was to galvanize the diplomatic muscle necessary to bring all nations into this problem and into this program. That was one of the failures.

So the answer to your question is that we have reduced production in some parts. True, we haven't reduced production in Afghanistan; we have not reduced it in all places under the control of the Burmese Communist Party; and if you want to set as the standard whether or not our diplomatic efforts have managed to decrease it in those countries, I'm sorry, sir, to say that, based on that standard, we are a failure.

But based on the standard of what we have done in Pakistan, what we have done in interdiction in Thailand, our moves with the United Nations now, our efforts to get the international communi-

ty involved where they are now involved, where money is now coming in and being pledged—we are not alone in the Andean region, we are not alone in Pakistan—I would say to you, sir, that by my criteria, I disagree completely with your statement.

Go around and ask the countries. See if they are more involved. See if they are more interested.

We have not solved the problem, but we think we have laid the foundations for the solution, and we are not saying we are going to solve the problem quickly or easily. It is going to be tough.

The fact that we have gotten these agreements doesn't mean we are going to succeed. It means we are going to try. It means it's worth the gamble, and anyone who would sit at this desk here and tell you that by U.S. diplomatic efforts we can put in some of these countries around the world, give them all of the capability to control their countries, uproot all corruption in those countries where they might exist, train their police forces, their air forces, do all of these things that are going to stop this trafficking, that person would be a charlatan and, I think, unworthy to come to you.

If that's the criterion, certainly our diplomatic efforts have failed. We think we have had successes. We hope those successes will continue, but there is no guarantee for success in this business.

[The statement of Mr. DiCarlo appears on p. 30.]

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Secretary, I'm going to assume that you missed the thrust of the criticism of members of this committee, and when you talk about diplomatic efforts, I assume you are using the vernacular of the State Department and you are talking about quiet, diplomatic efforts, aren't you?

Mr. DICARLO. Sir, I'm talking about the kinds of efforts that we think will produce the necessary results. I'm not talking——

Mr. RANGEL. Well, let me ask this. When I said "quiet," I meant, when I think of the issues that this great country of ours has a concern about, one of them that comes immediately to mind is communism and the spread of communism.

Why, my God, to think that it could come in the Caribbean caused us to invade the island to stop the spread of this dangerous philosophy in that area.

Another concern that we have is the Soviets and the Soviet-controlled countries.

My God, I just turn on the television, and I see Ambassador Kirkpatrick, who is not a shy person by any—and I don't think she's one that's involved in quiet diplomacy—and I hear her blasting the developing countries for everything.

With all of this diplomacy that you are talking about, we are dealing with nations, in many cases sending heavy military equipment to these nations, giving them economic and technical assistance, and each one of these nations is in violation of an international treaty.

And I ask you, Mr. Secretary, since this is such a high priority, when do the American people hear about this priority? When last do you remember the President of the United States talking about these people who belong to a family of nations, that should be concerned about the survival of the civilized world, talking about them with the same condemnation as he talks about a Fidel Castro?

When have you last heard Ambassador Kirkpatrick at the United Nations talk about these nations? Yes, they vote against; they vote with us; but each one is in violation of the international drug treaty. We haven't heard from her.

And certainly when it comes to Secretary Shultz, well, he'll strike out at terrorism no matter where it is, but when last has he given a speech concerning himself with the spread of narcotics throughout the United States?

Now I hear—and I don't know, I'm not a diplomat—that when we are concerned that we want to let these friendly nations know about our concern—friendly or unfriendly—we call back our ambassadors, and we debrief them, and we share with them our concerns, and we send them fulfilled with a new commitment as to what the directions are.

I went out of my way to make it abundantly clear that we are proud and support the efforts that you have made, but Mr. DiCarlo, you are not the U.S. Government, and when I talk about foreign policy, I'm talking about the President, I'm talking about the Secretary of State, and I'm talking about our Ambassador to the United Nations.

Now I may have missed a lot, but in those areas, we have used all of our diplomatic clout.

Mr. DiCarlo. May I answer the question first in this way? You mentioned that you are not speaking of me. I accept that. I'm speaking on behalf of the administration at the present time.

Mr. Rangel. How many people are on your staff?

Mr. DiCarlo. I have 111 people.

Mr. Rangel. Are they all stationed here in the State Department?

Mr. DiCarlo. No; here and overseas.

We also have, sir, at each embassy a person who is assigned, where we don't have a unit, the duty and function of handling this program.

Mr. Rangel. OK. Now——

Mr. DiCarlo. But if I can answer your fundamental question——

Mr. Rangel. Do you interview these ambassadors before they are appointed?

Mr. DiCarlo. Oh, yes. The ambassadors come in for discussions before they go out to posts; and when we visit their countries; and, when they come in; for consultations on home leave. Yes, sir, we do meet frequently with the ambassadors.

Mr. Rangel. I gather some of them go to sleep at the wheel.

Mr. DiCarlo. Well, sir, let me say this. I'd like to get into those questions. I'd like very much to answer them.

The first thing I would like to discuss is the responsibility of the State Department. I would like to point out first that it was the Congress of the United States that set forth section 481 giving the responsibility to the President, which the President in turn assigns the Secretary of State, and ultimately delegates the responsibility for this matter to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters. That is the foundation for the day-to-day operation.

I think you have missed something when you say that the President and the Secretary have not been involved or seized by this

subject. Perhaps I missed conveying it, and it's my fault, because it's my responsibility in my position to convey some of these things to the Congress.

Take the countries that produce the drugs. The President of the United States has been involved in correspondence. When their leaders visit this country, narcotics is included in the subject matter. I can assure you; it's on the agenda.

I can assure you that when the President visits those source countries, it's on the agenda. I can assure you that when the Secretary of State went to these countries, it was there. I can assure you—and perhaps it was missed, because of what the press happens to pick up or misses—in a country where the problem was particularly severe, in Colombia, it was brought up on a public platform by the President with the Colombians.

I can assure you, the Vice President of the United States has done it, and as you know, sir——

Mr. RANGEL. Well, we are going right back to your assurances, and when I see this——

Mr. DICARLO. I will get to that, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. I'm talking about the American people.

Mr. DICARLO. I will get to that.

Mr. RANGEL. And nobody controls the President's press conferences, and I just haven't heard anything about it.

Mr. DICARLO. I said no one controls the President's press conference, and it might be an indication of the interest of the people conducting or people asking questions, not of a response by the President.

But let me say this. I would like to say something about the subject you raise, and you raise it in the context of attacking a country, invading a country, and we are not doing this with narcotics.

It was my recommendation—and I stated it to the public, and I stated to the Congress—that there is no question that the people around the world, and particularly in the producing countries, know of the deep interest that the United States has in this problem, and one of the things we have attempted to do—one of the things we have attempted to do, and we think it is important if we are going to succeed in this problem, and I think it is working—is to convince them, as I said, that it's probably a more severe problem in their own country than in ours, and that is the case.

Let me say this. You know we hit a more responsive chord when the people in those countries——

Mr. RANGEL. How do you know? You never struck the other chord. How would you know?

Mr. DICARLO. Sir——

Mr. RANGEL. When you tell them about the corruption that exists in corrupt governments, how can they argue with you? When you tell them about the spread of addiction, when children of high-ranking officials are OD-ing, how can they argue with you?

Mr. DICARLO. You would be surprised, sir. If you spoke to high officials in other countries who are not directly affected by this problem, many of them did not even know the problem existed.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Secretary, what I am trying to say to you is, whether you are talking about the spread of narcotics or the spread of communism, we could have used this quiet approach in

explaining to the people in South America that as long as they did not provide basic services to their people, as long as they did not allow their farmers to have a little piece of land, that there would be terrorists, that there would be insurgents, but we don't do that. We go in, and we say, "It's not in America's interest for your government to continue like this."

Now the Dominick DiCarlos, I assume, follow and clean up after the Kirkpatricks and say, "Listen; this is what we really mean," but I'm saying, as far as the American people are concerned, we don't see the same effort exercised by our high-ranking public officials in the State Department and in the administration——

Mr. DICARLO. I understand now, sir.

Mr. RANGEL [continuing]. As we see with other concerns that we have.

Mr. DICARLO. I understand.

Mr. RANGEL. Now I'll ask you a question.

Mr. DICARLO. May I respond to that, sir?

Mr. RANGEL. Who is in charge of the whole operation anyway as it relates? You said that the Congress has mandated, you know, what is supposed to be done with these foreign countries.

If we were not working with you on a day-to-day basis, I would suspect that we'd have to call Dr. Carlton Turner to find out what our international direction was, because we have not found any direction from the Secretary of State.

Mr. DICARLO. Sir, I'd like to answer the first statement you made.

Mr. RANGEL. Sure.

Mr. DICARLO. Perhaps this is a question of perception. You may know of all the activities of the President; I'm sure you do; and the Attorney General knows it; and the foreign nations know it, because he speaks directly to them. But it's merely a question of getting that concern expressed to the American people.

Mr. RANGEL. Isn't that important, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. DICARLO. I think the President has expressed that concern on many occasions in many speeches on the issue of narcotics, and I'll give you the dates of the speeches, if you wish them, for the record.

Mr. RANGEL. Let me interrupt just for the permission of allowing your dear friend and mine, Ben Gilman, who has to go to a markup, but he recognizes that this may be your last official meeting with this committee, and he wants to be heard.

Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly want to welcome our Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters Dominick DiCarlo before our committee, and we regret that we are going to lose him to the judiciary very shortly, and we wish him well in his new post with the U.S. Court of International Trade. We certainly hope that he will be able to give the same kind of effort and the same kind of leadership there that he has given to us in the State Department.

I'm sure that Secretary DiCarlo realizes that any criticism we have certainly does not extend to your office, because you have done, to my mind—and I am certain that my colleagues join with

me—an outstanding job in trying to turn this problem around and try to raise the consciousness in the international community.

We understand the burdens and the complexity of the problem and how difficult it is to raise that issue.

I guess the comments you are hearing this morning come from somewhat of a feeling of frustration that we all have as we give our best efforts and find so little bottom line result in the amount of product still reaching our shores and the number of abuses that are still being effected, the number of deaths that are resulting, the extensive amount of trafficking that still exists, that far exceeds our most profitable corporations of our Nation.

I particularly want to commend Secretary DiCarlo for his efforts in trying to obtain more cooperation from the international community with regard to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, and I have joined Mr. DiCarlo on several occasions as he has made appeals at the United Nations meetings both here and abroad, to try to convince them to make a better effort.

I was looking back over the figures. I note that, even despite our best entreaties, in 1982 there were only 42 nations out of a membership nation of 157 in the United Nations that contributed a little over $6 million. In 1983, it dropped down to 28 nations that contributed a little over $3 million. And I don't know what the figures are for 1984.

I know our new chairman of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control has been doing an outstanding effort—Mr. di Gennaro—in trying to encourage other nations, and Italy has raised its own contribution, but it's still far from what is truly needed out there on the international front to try to bring about a worldwide effort.

A paltry $4 to $5 to $6 million certainly hardly pays for distributing even one brochure around the world, let alone to bring about a sound international effort to combat billions of drug trafficking around the world. Our own Nation spends over a billion dollars in this effort. We can't even get some $10 million together in the international community let alone to get the various major countries to contribute.

It's appalling that major nations like the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China still fail to contribute to this effort when we know that even in their own countries they, too, have become victims to some extent with narcotics. We will never know the full extent of that narcotics addiction.

I think what we are most concerned about when we talk about the international effort is something you have been working on and something we have been trying to appeal to other nations, and that is to raise the consciousness to the problem, raise the priority of the problem.

We very much appreciated the meeting yesterday with our Secretary of State Shultz and yourself, stressing that very point, that with the State Department, we hope as a result of that, the Secretary's indication that he intends to make an even more strenuous effort in that direction will come about at an early date, since we think that that certainly can help in our mutual efforts.

I'm wondering, Mr. DiCarlo, as you get ready to leave this throne of authority and power in the State Department in an area where

we feel you have done such an outstanding job, particularly as we compare it with past administrations and past leaders in that effort who, we found, left a lot to be desired, do you have any recommendations to this committee or to future leaders of your office of what best can be done to improve this situation—the growing production, the growing trafficking, the growing problem—despite our best efforts and despite the money that we are putting into the problem?

We would welcome any thoughts that you might have, or how best this committee can help in that endeavor.

Mr. DiCarlo. I think what we have to do is recognize first, as we said here, that we are not going to get the quick solution, we are not going to get the quick fix.

I gave the example before of the quantities of drugs produced.

You know, many people now say when they have problems in the United States about drugs, the solution seems to be just get them to stop and the problem will go away. That is going to be tough. It's going to be long.

One thing I would suggest is recognize this as a long-term problem and not as a solution or something that is going to be solved tomorrow or even reduced substantially tomorrow as far as the drugs coming into the United States.

I think we need a recognition that the United States alone, no matter what kind of leverage you may have been able to exert in the past in other countries, does not have the necessary leverage, the ability on its own to simultaneously effect reductions in all key growing areas, and therefore we have to get the international community involved. I think the greatest effort that we can do internationally is, as you say, getting more countries involved.

On that score, I'd like to make a point about the money you mentioned in the statement. That is not the money that was pledged. In fact, the United States alone pledged $2.5 million, which does not appear in those figures.

Those figures will not reflect, if you take the 1983 and 1984 pledges, the amounts pledged by the Government of Italy, which is $40 million over a 5-year period which will go into the project at the time the projects are developed. It does not reflect the special development program in Pakistan where we have additional pledges, from the United Kingdom of 1 million pounds, something they haven't approached before; and it doesn't reflect an additional $5 million in contributions by Italy.

I think what we need is that—more international involvement, and we are working on that.

We need our strength in our bilateral programs, and those bilateral programs will be strengthened when other governments are also in the area, so that it is not only the United States constantly haranguing these governments—and we do that; I harangue, and it appears in the press.

One of the problems some of these governments tell us that they have is that, when they do something in answer to the narcotics problem, even though they want to do it out of self-interest, immediately the accusation goes up that they are doing it because of pressure from Big Brother North America, even though it is inaccurate.

That's why it's important, I think, that the United States, through its President, and through its Secretary of State, and through all the other officials, firmly and effectively let these people know of our concern.

But the only place I differ with the chairman is on the question as to whether or not it's more effective, given that situation, that it is many times more difficult, if they are perceived to be acting solely from a stick wielded by the United States, whether it really makes sense, because of image and perceptions that we go over to a country and say, "Unless you do this, we are going to invade you," or "we are going to beat you over the head," or "we are going to do that."

I agree with the chairman that the President and everyone else has to make sure that that message is conveyed.

I thought the President's interest was conveyed. Perhaps there's more we can do and will do, but I would object, and I would offer as advice, that if you are dealing with many countries—and countries are different, people are different, temperaments are different—sometimes the worst thing we can do is for anyone to get up in the United Nations, castigate and browbeat, for the purpose of satisfying public opinion if the job can be done more effectively, and I think it can be done diplomatically.

I'd like to point out one thing——

Mr. RANGEL. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICARLO. I'd be pleased to yield to the chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. I want the record to state that I agree with your analysis 100 percent, but I do believe that a lot more could be done by a different approach in the United Nations.

I was only recommending an approach consistent with that of Ambassador Kirkpatrick as relates to drugs.

Mr. DICARLO. I was just concerned, sir, about the analogies made to invasions and the statement that we should perhaps do that in drugs because we have done it here.

Mr. RANGEL. All I'm saying is that I was trying to make an analogy of how uptight this Nation gets to the point of invasion. Nothing I said should be interpreted as supporting those actions, whether rhetorically by our Ambassador to the United Nations or militarily by the President of the United States.

My only concern is that you can't have quiet diplomacy where no one knows what you are doing, on the one hand, when we know the capacity of our Government to do something else when they are concerned, on the other hand.

I yield back.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, if I might interject—and I regret I'm going to have to go to a markup, but I'll try to return after that—yes, there is the necessity to have that kind of proper diplomacy as you discuss the issue, but I hasten to say that the need for discussing the issue is still prevalent, and we are not doing enough of that, and we are not doing enough of it in a public forum, and we don't do enough of encouraging other nations, for their own benefit, to take an interest in this issue.

You know, so often you and I have heard, "Well, if it wasn't for the demand, there wouldn't be the supply;" "Look to your own Nation, and reduce the demand, and you won't have the supply."

But the producing nations soon find that they become victim nations, and we find it more and more each and every day, and I think that approach is sound to remind them that they, too, have a benefit.

Mr. DiCarlo. I think we are all in agreement that we have to do more, and we are going to continue to do more, and more can always be done. But those are some of the problems as I see it, because, you know, we are having some very substantial successes now.

If I came here 2 years ago and predicted that we would have the success in Pakistan—and help from the international community with Pakistan—that we have had today, and predicted Colombia would advance to the point where it is now, with its agreement now to eradicate, I think you would have said at that time that we were being optimistic. I think we have accomplished a great deal in that regard.

Much more needs to be accomplished, and granted, the gains have not resulted in a decrease of production yet. The program has to take effect, it has to take time, and all I'm saying is we have to be patient, even if sometimes our constituents are not—and I don't blame them, but sometimes patience in a long-term haul is essential. To indicate otherwise, to indicate that the State Department has within its authority the power to say, "Stop, or we are going to cut off assistance," and narcotics production will terminate, I think, would be wrong—and we are not doing that. But some people are. In the streets, you talk about it, and you hear about it. To indicate that, I think, would be to undercut our programs and to defeat us.

I think this committee has done an excellent job. I think your travels have brought home the point that we are concerned. I think your travels have brought out to these countries these factors we have mentioned.

I think what the administration has done has also made this point. I don't think your work was a failure. I don't think your diplomatic efforts have failed. I think there are some successes, and I think you and the people in the Senate, through your taking the time to make these trips, and the Attorney General, State Department officials, and other people have all contributed to the climate that we now have.

I don't think there's anyone there who can say that this climate has not changed both in the producing countries and in the consumer countries.

I don't think anyone can say we are back to where we were three or four years ago when the French refused to acknowledge a problem, and the British said it didn't exist, Mr. Gilman. At my conferences last week in Vienna, another important Western nation has given instructions to its foreign ministry to make this a major item of reporting. They never had it on their agenda.

Country after country is now putting narcotics on their political agenda. This is the key to success. We don't have that kind of leverage to tell a country to stop and they are going to stop.

If this problem depends on a relationship between the United States and any other country, and this is an annual crop—heroin, you plant it, and it grows that year. If we are going to build these

relationships and we are going to make it dependent upon the U.S. relationship with a country—many of these countries have very tenuous relationships. What we are trying to do is broaden that, so that if the relationship sours or the aid doesn't continue, they'll continue the program because of pressure from the balance of the international community and, more importantly, from their own self-interest.

That's what we are trying to do. I think to a great extent we are accomplishing it. If I can ask the Congress to do anything it is to examine it from that perspective.

Are we now changing our relationships with other countries? Do they now see the problem? Have we now instituted programs which never existed before, which have not borne fruit yet? They are just starting. It is going to be extremely difficult. There are going to be failures. But if we recognize it—what I appeal to the Congress to do is to recognize this as a long-term problem.

That doesn't mean we don't do anything now. We do as much as we can now to get stuff out of production, but just don't allow those who would create the impression that, you know, snap your fingers and there it goes, we can tell them to stop and they are going to stop. That is the most dangerous thing that can be done.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, we certainly again want to commend you for your efforts.

I guess our problem and our frustration stems from the fact when we see young people who are succumbing to overdose that we can't afford the patience that some of our diplomatic programs may call for, and Congress usually reacts in a very—reacts more quickly to these crises than some of our long-range planners do.

That brings me to another issue of course. Over the years, we have seen a lack of long-range planning, long-range strategies, and I hope in your final days that you would encourage, not so much in the State Department because you're out there continually trying to raise that problem with other nations, but we do need at the executive level a more effective, coordinated, long-range plan of how we attack this problem.

I, for one, as a member of this committee, have yet to see that kind of a good, long-range strategy evolve from all of the planning sessions that take place on this issue.

Mr. DICARLO. Sir, I want to thank you for your kind words that you stated at the beginning. I think it's good that Congress pushes us and prods us and is concerned. We all are.

I know that with Mr. Rangel and with you, I served in the early 1960's in a legislative body. I know of both of your interests in the problem then, and I know of the fact that I come from the same State and same city as Mr. Rangel. We know we have to be impatient with people dying, and we have to prod our people who are in positions like mine.

All I'm saying is that, having done that, I think we all have to recognize that the problem has no easy solution, it is a complicated problem, and continue to work together.

I appreciate working with you here, and I know that our relationship will continue in the future after I leave.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

I don't want to have any quarrel with you, and I really think that once you join the State Department, there must be something that happens where you are more concerned about the sensitivity of a nation's sovereignty, and we can't say anything to offend them, and you can do more with sugar than you can with a stick and all that, but you have to realize that President Nixon, when he told the Mexicans that he wanted to use paraquat and spray, they said not on Mexican soil, that they had a long tradition that the soil was the soul of the nation, until he closed the borders, and then all of a sudden they took another look at heroin eradication.

I remember so well when Lester Wolff and I were severely criticized by the State Department because of remarks that we had made about the Government of Turkey. We had no idea about the national pride of the Turks, and the more we would criticize them, we were told, the more they would just ignore America's pleas to try to control opium. Then President Nixon cut off military assistance, and they banned opium completely.

All I'm saying is that I do recognize that it's a very complex and it's not a simplistic problem, but in the nations that we have gone to, there has been some serious question by some of these people about how serious were we.

You have to admit that some of the legal sanctions that were enacted into law, signed by the President, were tools that the diplomats were able to use in saying that the Congress did mean business and that we were seriously impacted.

But we have a long way to go if you are going to convince me that it is perceived by the American people that the President and the Secretary of State and our Ambassador to the United Nations have this item high on their priority as relates to foreign policy.

You can send me all the dates you want, but you and I read the same newspapers, we talk to basically the same type of people, and I'm telling you that it doesn't exist as a perception. I can't argue with you, Mr. Secretary, that in your day-to-day work you don't feel sure that you have their 100 percent support.

I was there yesterday. The Secretary knows you by your first name, knows the countries that you have been to. You mentioned our Attorney General. I don't know how that fits into our foreign policy, but I assume because of the Justice Department and DEA that he is going overseas.

But those of us in and out of Government know how our Government can respond to an international crisis that concerns us, and I'm saying to you, Mr. Secretary, that we have not seen—and I'm not recommending it—but we have not seen the kind of outcry, or indignation, by the people that I've mentioned as it relates to international trafficking of drugs and its effect on the United States as we have in other areas.

This doesn't mean that you don't know how to push people around diplomatically. It means that we do want to hear more from the Secretary and the President, and I have every reason to believe that we will.

So whoever succeeds you, I hope that you don't take our criticism in saying that you are not doing the best with what you have to work with, but we demand more, and we don't take the argument

that you have to be quiet and let them work it out because they are sensitive people.

I would briefly like to go over some of these countries with you. In Mexico, we expect an expansion in opium cultivation there, and it's also my understanding that they say that they lack the money for crop substitutions. I never understood——

Mr. DiCarlo. There is no crop substitution program in Mexico.

Mr. Rangel. Well, they are asking for money for one.

Mr. DiCarlo. They didn't ask us, and we will not, as a matter of policy, give money for crop substitution in areas where you don't have the kind of traditional growth of longstanding illicit drugs from the past. We think it would be counterproductive and would encourage the growth of drugs elsewhere.

Mr. Rangel. Well, I'm just sharing with you that Ben Gilman and I met with the newly appointed—what is it?—minister of justice—head of the federal police, and he had indicated that he needed some assistance from the United States in this area because the farmers were poor, and that they were growing dependent on marijuana and opium, and that he needed some help. So that we'll get to you.

Mr. DiCarlo. Just for the record, sir, I'd say that is not the position of the Mexican Government. It may have been that individual's position.

Mr. Rangel. And I suspect, in Peru, we should, notwithstanding the agreement—that we should still be expecting a bumper crop coming out of Peru.

Mr. DiCarlo. Sir, our agreements with Peru call for the eradication of 4,000 hectares; 4,000 hectares will not affect the quantity coming into the United States.

We could cut the production of coca in half in the first year, and it would not affect the amount of cocaine coming into the United States. It's a long-term proposition, and until we affect it simultaneously, as we said, in the key growing areas of Bolivia, and Peru, and Colombia, it will come in because the crop is large and we will get ours until the programs are well underway.

Mr. Rangel. OK. So the agreements that we have, we shouldn't expect any immediate impact?

Mr. DiCarlo. As far as cocaine coming into the United States, the production of coca is more than triple what is necessary to produce the quantity—any range of quantity you want—of cocaine currently being consumed.

Mr. Rangel. Did we ever get an agreement out of Jamaica?

Mr. DiCarlo. No, sir, we do not have an agreement out of Jamaica.

Mr. Rangel. Why not?

Mr. DiCarlo. We have not gotten the agreement, and we are presently in negotiation. We are very happy to discuss that with you in closed session.

Mr. Rangel. Wasn't the Prime Minister of Jamaica the first head of a foreign country our President entertained in his Presidency?

Mr. DiCarlo. I believe it was.

Mr. RANGEL. And wasn't it at the insistence of the Jamaican Government that the Congress embarked on the Caribbean Basin Initiative?

Mr. DICARLO. I would assume the Congress embarked because it felt it was good legislation, or the Executive may have proposed it.

Mr. RANGEL. Isn't this the country that we are depending on?

Mr. DICARLO. You would know that better than I. I have no knowledge as to the way it was reacted in Jamaica—I don't know that.

Mr. RANGEL. OK. Well, let me tell you this, Mr. Secretary. I'm going to turn the questioning over to Mr. Guarini, and again I'd like to tell you that we are proud of the work that you are doing, and we think you need a lot of help, and we hope that those that are here that report to the President or to the White House would know that we would expect that the American people would want to hear about some of the things that are being done by the President and by the Secretary of State, and I guess I've missed something by Ambassador Kirkpatrick as well.

We can't talk about this in the United Nations. Is this against the DiCarlo strategy to mention it in the United Nations, or what are you recommending?

Mr. DICARLO. Perhaps I should say again that we do mention it in the United Nations, and I think Congressman Gilman is there often; I don't know whether Ambassador Kirkpatrick is frequently in Vienna; but the place where narcotics are discussed at the United Nations is primarily in Vienna, which houses those agencies, and I can assure you——

Mr. RANGEL. I'm talking about nations that are in violation of international treaties. They are sitting there; they are not making contributions; and they are sitting there, some of them receiving assistance from the United States.

Are you suggesting that diplomatically Ambassador Kirkpatrick shouldn't raise this?

Mr. DICARLO. No, sir, I'm not saying——

Mr. RANGEL [continuing]. Or offending some of these countries?

Mr. DICARLO. I'm not saying that she should not raise the issue. I'm suggesting to you that it is raised in the organs of the United Nations but perhaps not by Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

I will certainly convey to her and to the Secretary, as you did, I believe, sir, that information.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Guarini.

Mr. GUARINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DiCarlo, I thank you for the time you gave us yesterday with Secretary of State Shultz as well as your remarks today.

You call for patience, and yet of course the situation is getting worse.

I, for one, am impatient, I have the impression that the State Department has put this issue on the back burner, notwithstanding your objection to my impressions.

I have concluded that, were it not for those countries themselves getting into trouble within their own borders because of the growth of narcotics. These countries have now become user nations, whereas before they had solely been producer nations. They would not really do anything or cooperate in any way, because they haven't

been pushed by our Government, by our administration, or by our State Department.

I think that we have never adequately used the leverage we have because we gave national defense and security as the first preference. We never really linked the narcotics problems as part of the serious friction that we have between our countries.

When I hear of our State Department talking in terms of civil rights of other countries, and freedoms that we fight for the peoples of other countries, the State Department raises its voice loud and clear. When the State Department talks about land reform in other countries, or when they talk about the death marches in other countries, we hear a great deal about it. What the State Department says is heard throughout the world.

Yet when it comes to narcotics, there seems to be a silence, and if it weren't for some urging and some pushing, perhaps there'd even be less action than there is now.

I have visited with ambassadors who represent our country and I have come away with the impressions that they are going to be nice to us, and entertain us, and this is what their mission is.

I got the impression in Thailand and other places that, "This is a group of people that are do-gooders, but that they are not going to pull me off my course, because I'm interested in the other aspects of the State Department's work."

What I'm trying to say is that my observation, having gone around the world, having gone through South America, is that we are not getting the mileage out of speaking up and putting muscle behind what we really believe, and we are not really telling these people how much this is hurting us in the world, and were it not for the fact that they are getting pinched by their own production, very, very little would be done out there today.

I think that's a sorry state of affairs, because you call for patience; but we call for a program of action. There's a difference between the two. One is passive, and one is active.

I don't want to serve on this committee any longer if I don't think that my Government, and my State Department are going to put more strength, and more determination, and more spirit behind trying to get rid of the source of narcotics in other parts of the world.

Let me say that there are a couple of things that I think our Government isn't doing. I think there are people who are jealous of each other's turf. I think that there are certain jurisdictional prerogatives that people locally, State, county, and within our own Government agencies are exercising among themselves. There's no pinpoint of responsibility. There's no adequate funding, and there's no national strategy.

Where is the leadership to come from but from the administration?

We know that you have a sensitivity in dealing with national defense problems with these other countries, but I think that it is as important to our country in regard to getting rid of the drug problem in America as it is to talk about death marches, land reform, civil rights in other countries, or terrorism in other countries.

All I want to do, Mr. DiCarlo, is see us raise our voice in the State Department and in the administration with the same striden-

cy that we hear in regard to the other problems that seem to face the State Department.

So I think you are in a unique position because your advice is sought by us, by the Nation, and by your own Secretary of State. If you say, "Be patient," that is not enough, because that shows an attitude which is not sufficient enough for us to get to the problems that we have before us.

Mr. DiCarlo. I think I agree with a great deal of what you say, but let me say this. I don't say be patient and do nothing. What I am saying, in effect, is be impatient; push; but recognize the fact that the problem is not going to be solved tomorrow. So that's the distinction I want to make. We are active in these areas.

Let me get to one point about the ambassadors that were mentioned. I've been to the places around the world, too. I've been to Colombia, and I see an ambassador there that is working day and night, and this is the prime issue on his agenda. He is working with the Colombians, working with the rest of the international community.

I've been to Bolivia, and I've seen an ambassador there who has placed this on the top of his agenda in our other key growing region and is working at this problem day in and day out.

I went to Peru. Our new Ambassador there has called in the other ambassadors to discuss solely this issue, and he has been briefed at the White House, in my office, and everywhere else about this problem, and he is engaged in the issue.

Mr. Guarini. More is being done now, I agree, but by the same token, we have let the situation really exacerbate to the point that it is so critical that we are at a crisis level.

In Bolivia, you are right, we have a great Ambassador there, and he is very, very concerned about it, but in Peru the Ambassador you had there never even visited the areas that were under concern. He never left the capital city, from what we were able to understand. He was there for a couple of years. We weren't satisfied with that. We went over the mountains in Peru. I think the chairman remembers that trip more than anybody else. But the Ambassador hadn't even taken enough interest to go there.

That is what I mean when I say that you have got to get our representatives believing that this is something that has to be done, but if you don't believe it at the top, they are not going to believe it below you.

Mr. DiCarlo. I think if you go to our Ambassador to Pakistan—present Ambassador, past Ambassador—you will find the kind of activity on narcotics, speaking out publicly on this issue.

I disagree with one point——

Mr. Guarini. But John Dean just arrived about a month ago.

Mr. DiCarlo. I've had a discussion with the chairman about one ambassador you mentioned. I think he is engaged in the problem. We differ. Perhaps the reaction to the individual was different, but I believe he is engaged in the problem, but that perhaps is a difference of opinion there.

I think our ambassadors are seized with the issue. I think it is a topic of their agenda in these countries, particularly the key growing areas. It is on the agenda of others in other areas to talk to their counterparts in government.

And I agree with you, we don't want an inactive program. What I am trying to say is we have an exceedingly active program in Pakistan, in Colombia, in Bolivia, in Peru. We are not sitting back.

I don't mean that progress is not going to be made now. I'm just saying unfortunately we may not see the results of that progress in the short term.

One of the things I tell people about our program when I go there, I tell them quite frankly, you know, in its initial stages, when we reduce the amount of coca in Peru or the amount of poppy elsewhere in the world, we are not going to be the first recipients of our programs.

Who is going to benefit? The people in those countries, the people who would have become the victims by the increase and extra increase in production are probably the primary beneficiaries, the first beneficiaries of the cutback. We were first in; we may be last out.

Mr. RANGEL. Do you think it would help if the President was to call our ambassadors and to thank them for the wonderful job they are doing in obtaining cooperation from the host countries and to reinforce his longstanding commitment to international cooperation in this effort? Do you think this might give some type of national attention or international attention as to the priority that this country has in this area?

Mr. DICARLO. Could that be one of the things that the President might do? It's something that perhaps should be considered, along with many other things. But I think the President has recognized the efforts of people. They know; they report to the President; he discusses with them.

Mr. RANGEL. OK. You know, you and I are passing each other in the middle of the night. You don't have any problem with the support that you get from the President and Secretary Shultz, and I'm talking about what America does not know, and if we didn't know, you would be in worse trouble than we are today.

Mr. DICARLO. Sir, I think we can agree on something, Mr. Rangel, and that is, if we are talking about a question not of effort but of perception, I think we should examine that, because as far as the effort being made, it's fully reported in that report in country after country progress is being made.

If that perception is not being conveyed, then I think we have work to do and we should improve that perception.

Mr. GUARINI. Mr. DiCarlo, you have addressed yourself to the international situation, and of course all of this is linked together, and there are many parts to the puzzle, and you have had, certainly, observations about lowering the demand. One thing is the production and supply, and the other thing is the demand.

Observing, through your years and your experience, and from your vantage point, what has been going on, what you would make as recommendations as to how our Nation, in and of itself, can do more even here at home than we have been doing?

Where are we lacking in a coordination of our program within our own borders?

Mr. DICARLO. If you are asking me on testifying on some other area, I can tell you that as it affects us and affects the internation-

al effort—and I have said this to many groups in the United States—what goes on here is important to us.

I think one of the problems we have in many of the countries where we travel is, while we tell them that they have to do something, they usually point to reports coming in from our newspapers about perhaps some things that might be called violations of the treaty in our own country.

I think we have to be careful that we, who cannot cast stones without making sure we don't live in a glass house as well, that we don't preach what we ourselves don't practice.

Many times it's a question of perception, and I think we have to make sure within our country domestically that we are doing all that we should. If I were to offer a suggestion to the Congress, you should back to the hilt our efforts to eradicate cannabis in our country at all times. That's something that would help us overseas.

I think there is a perception overseas when they read in magazines the fact that, in the streets of my city, people can go outside a courthouse and sell drugs openly on the street without interference. I think here something is happening in our local law enforcement that we are going to have to be very careful of.

We can't depend merely on the Federal Government providing or duplicating—which it can never duplicate—a national police force to take care of those problems. I think we should be concerned about this attitude. That's a perception I have, that the local governments more and more are saying, "Well, it's an overseas problem." They are saying, "Don't bother me about heroin. They don't grow poppy on the streets of my city." We have to be careful of that response.

Mr. GUARINI. Do you feel you are getting the support you need to carry out your mission?

Mr. DICARLO. I think our mission would be much easier to carry out if there was a different perception abroad about our domestic efforts. There is a perception that we are really not serious.

When they read in the paper about heroin sold openly on the streets of New York, or when they read about the marijuana shops, and when they read about the fact that people are arrested because laws in the State of New York put these people right back on the street again, they have the idea that we are telling them what they should be doing, and perhaps we are not too concerned for our own backyard.

I think we can strengthen that aspect of it—and perhaps it's perception. It's our newspapers always willing to say that the largest cash crop—when it isn't—in the United States happens to be a drug, that's played up, then this hurts us.

I think if we can eliminate those perceptions, get more local law enforcement, get law enforcement to match what the Federal Government has done—and it has increased its law enforcement capabilities and its task forces federally—to see whether or not they don't just take that as a substitute for their efforts.

We hear about surpluses in our State treasuries, and they are not too quick to look at the Federal Government, but perhaps spend some of their assets in this, I think we can do a job. I think basically it's going to be local law enforcement——

Mr. GUARINI. Let me just——

Mr. DiCarlo [continuing]. That has to get involved in this, and through the chairman—agrees with me that more stringent local law enforcement, together with a strengthened Federal enforcement is a way——

Mr. Rangel. But I assume you agree with the administration that they should not give assistance to strengthen local law enforcement. That's the big problem.

I mean you act as though the local communities were growing opium and coca. They need help, and this administration refuses to acknowledge that they need to render assistance in order to do a job.

Mr. DiCarlo. I, sir, would leave it to the Congress and to the administration to battle on the political problem as to whether or not many States—in fact, my mayor reported a huge surplus—whether or not they are in a better condition at this time to take care of that problem or whether that problem should be borne by the National Treasury, or whether or not it is better borne by the people in the area——

Mr. Rangel. Well, you said——

Mr. DiCarlo. I don't know. I'm leaving that problem to the administration——

Mr. Rangel. Well, no, you are not either. You said that this would be of assistance to you as you have done or those that follow you—your international work.

Now I would ask you the question, who would be in charge of trying to formulate this policy in order to assist you to make certain that——

Mr. DiCarlo. I'm sure all of us have that responsibility.

Mr. Rangel. I mean nationally, in this administration, who would be the one, when you report as to what you need, and you need a perception that we enforce the law in the United States, and that people——

Mr. DiCarlo. Sir, I've made that speech around the country. I've made the statement in our meetings with our Cabinet counsels, with our committees, this is an important element of the problem. I think this administration——

Mr. Rangel. Who would respond to this legitimate request? I mean certainly you don't expect every sheriff—you don't expect Mayor Koch to respond; you don't expect the sheriffs to respond. Who in our National Government, if this committee wanted to say you made a lot of sense and we are going to follow up on that——

Mr. DiCarlo. I don't think there's any one person that has to encourage local government to do their job. It is the responsibility of us all.

Mr. Rangel. That's where we disagree. We would like to believe that somewhere along the line there is somebody in this administration that is as concerned as we are about what you just mentioned and that they would be coordinating this effort the same way you have been charged with the responsibility of coordinating the international——

Mr. DiCarlo. It would be an interesting constitutional problem to see if we can create a czar to coordinate local law enforcement.

Mr. Rangel. Well, "czar" sounds a little communistic to me, but——

Mr. DiCarlo. A dictator.

Mr. Rangel [continuing]. I would say an effective Federal coordinator with access to the Chief Executive might be a better term.

Mr. Guarini. Is the problem severe enough, in your estimation, that we should have one person you can pinpoint the responsibility on that would have a direct relationship, personal relationship, with the President of the United States, as a special representative of the President to coordinate all these factions?

Mr. DiCarlo. I always liked, as a former legislator, to look at the legislation and see whether or not I think that would do the job.

I think the problem I have is the perception that we are going to have someone who can handle budget and everything else and have the ability to move budgets and move different agencies.

I don't know whether or not we can fashion such a bill within the framework of our system that could function in that way.

Mr. Guarini. We have done it with trade. We have a special trade representative that has Cabinet rank, Mr. Brock, who then relates directly to the President, and he brings trade problems to the President.

I don't understand why we can't in this country have a person that could look into law enforcement, foreign affairs matters, education, health, et cetera.

Mr. DiCarlo. We have a Cabinet Council on Legal Policy headed by the Attorney General, where all of the agencies come and discuss these problems.

The Attorney General of the United States is part of the President's Cabinet, and discusses the issues with the President. In fact, a result of one of those discussions and recommendations made by the head of that Cabinet Council, was a recommendation to start the working group with the Government of Italy which is proceeding now.

So I think we have a person who does speak with the President. These matters are brought up at the Cabinet Council, and the Attorney General, an officer, does discuss these issues.

Mr. Guarini. Mr. DiCarlo, if this is a serious problem, which we admit, and which is your life's work, certainly when the Attorney General sits at a Cabinet meeting or talks matters with the President, with all his duties that he has, a whole myriad of problems, constitutional problems, administrative problems, et cetera, this is only one small part of his agenda.

How could he adequately give enough personal attention, as one person, to the narcotics problem when he has got an agenda and a plate full of 100 other things?

Mr. DiCarlo. I would just point out, sir, that most of the bills that have come before the Congress, the Attorney General is the person that would exercise that function, even under the so-called czar bills.

Mr. Rangel. Let's see whether we can do this, Mr. Guarini. There's a vote on the journal, and we have a representative from AID.

We have received your testimony.

[The statement of Mr. Kimball appears on p. 34.]

Mr. Rangel. We would like to have an informal discussion with you at some later date, and thank you for the work that your

agency is doing in cooperation with the other part of our Government.

Mr. Ortiz, before we leave, why don't you direct your questions to the Secretary?

Mr. ORTIZ. I know we don't have enough time; we have a vote; but I would like to echo my colleagues' comments that it gets to the point where we are very frustrated, and from what I have been able to get, it seems to be that there is a lack of communication all the way from the White House to the local level.

We have had hearings where we have had a special task force that hasn't been able to work with the local officials. Now we don't have anybody that we can go to and present our problems so that we can get something done. It's just frustrating; it gets very frustrating.

I'm sorry, I wish I could go on, but we have a vote, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. We do.

But, again, let me reiterate that we are proud of the job that you have done as a fellow American and partner in Government, and if we could find your counterpart in the administration as relates to domestic affairs, it would be very helpful to us.

Good luck; congratulations; Godspeed.

Mr. DICARLO. I want to thank the chairman for the excellent cooperation that we have received from the committee, and thank them for many of the things that we were able to do because of your efforts.

Mr. RANGEL. The meeting stands adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

[The following was received for the record:]

PREPARED STATEMENTS

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CHARLES B. RANGEL

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Today the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control will continue its examination of the administration's performance in the area of international narcotics control. We will limit our inquiry and analysis to the methods by which the U.S. Department of State and the Agency for International Development will seek to implement the conclusions and recommendations made in the committee's report of its study missions to Latin America and Jamaica in August of 1983, and to Asia and Italy, in January of this year. This report was issued by the select committee last week.

It is my sad duty to report to you, that we are unequivocally losing the effort overseas to control the illicit production and trafficking of narcotics which are so tragically affecting the United States. It is the perception of this committee, reiterated in the recently released Study Mission Report, that our failure in bringing these illicit narcotics under control, has been of diplomacy. Not only have we failed to progress or hold the status quo in international narcotics control, we have retrogressed enormously in the past 5 years.

All of the indicators lead to the inescapable conclusion that drugs are available in the United States in amounts unprecedented in our history. The illegal market is flooded with narcotics produced abroad, ironically by many nations friendly to the United States.

There are in this country an estimated 500,000 active heroin addicts. The Northeast, Mid-Atlantic and Southwest border regions of the Nation are experiencing a dramatic increase in heroin addiction triggered by the commensurate increased

availability of heroin from Southwest Asia as well as from the infamous "Golden Triangle" area of Southeast Asia. We are hearing too of heroin again coming across the Mexican border.

We have heard all too often, just in the past year, in the course of meetings and hearings that this committee has held throughout the country, how there is a veritable "cocaine glut" on the market. In 1983 it was estimated that about 60 tons of cocaine entered this country, a dramatic increase from the estimated 25 tons reported available here just 4 years ago in 1980.

About 75 percent of the cocaine affecting the United States is clandestinely manufactured in Colombia from coca paste smuggled from Peru and Bolivia where it is produced. Since 1981 Colombia has had on line its own coca leaf production which also contributes a share to the traffic of cocaine directed to the United States.

An estimated 15,000 to 60,000 tons of marijuana is believed to be entering the United States from abroad, to augment an estimated 2,000 tons of domestic marijuana. While some reports indicate that the use of marijuana among the Nation's high school seniors is leveling off, or is even declining slightly, there remain an estimated 25 million users of marijuana in the United States. The numbers are simply staggering.

In large measure the failure of our international initiatives to control the production of narcotics in the source countries, as well as the trafficking of these dangerous substances worldwide, emanates from the lack of priority the State Department attaches to international narcotics control. The Department of State is responsible for ensuring that the U.S. Government implements its obligations under the international narcotic and psychotropic conventions, and that other governments comply with their obligations, particularly those where an illicit cultivation, manufacturing or trafficking problem may exist and thereby threaten the United States.

We send millions, in some cases, billions of dollars, in economic and military assistance to most of the source nations of illicit narcotics, yet these nations refuse to fulfill their moral and legal obligations to eliminate illicit narcotic crop production within their borders. We recognize that the immediate total eradication of illicit narcotic crop cultivation is an unreasonable goal, but this does not mean that a plan cannot be prepared and a start made to progressively eliminate narcotic crops within a reasonable period of time.

In the meantime the select committee believes that the State Department and the administration should implement the following initiatives as soon as possible:

1. Secretary of State Shultz should begin an immediate and continuing dialogue with the Foreign Ministers of drug producing and trafficking nations, to determine what diplomatic and economic steps can be taken in concert to achieve more effective international narcotics policies.

2. U.N. Ambassador Kirkpatrick should begin a regular dialogue on narcotics problems at the United Nations with her fellow representatives to seek the means to strengthen the various U.N. narcotics control bodies and bring the focus of world opinion to bear on the source nations.

3. President Reagan should recall all of our Ambassadors to the drug producing and transshipment nations, to a White House conference to emphasize the importance which this Nation attaches to narcotics control and the seriousness with which the Congress and the American people are demanding action in this vitally important area.

We intend to work with the diplomatic community in order to shift our national posture with regard to these issues and the countries involved in order that we may bring to an end the scourge that is drug abuse. It is our purpose to raise the narcotics issue from a secondary consideration of our foreign policy to one that is not only crucial but is rightly perceived as a most serious threat to the health and welfare of every American as well as to the overall security of this Nation.

Our witnesses this morning will be Assistant Secretary of State, Dominick L. DiCarlo of the Bureau of International Narcotic Matters and Frank B. Kimball, Counselor to the Agency for International Development. I would like to welcome you and thank you for testifying today.

Testimony of Assistant Secretary Dominick L. DiCarlo, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters

Mr. Chairman: Our strategy for international narcotics control was defined in the early months of this administration by the testimony of Under Secretary Stoessel before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Today, I will review key elements of

that strategy, and discuss progress we have made through our diplomatic initiatives and program efforts.

The Department advised the Congress we would give priority to: Increased assistance from and political involvement by the international community; greater acceptance by producer and transit countries of their national and international responsibilities under treaties; greater awareness by source and donor nations that drug abuse and drug trafficking are not just problems of the United States; expansion of crop control and interdiction programs in source countries; and increased linkage between narcotics-related economic assistance and production controls.

We have made considerable progress toward those goals.

The Department also testified in the early months of this administration on the conditions precedent which influence the effectiveness of control programs, including the need for governments to have control of growing areas and the political will to eliminate production. There is a fundamental truth about U.S. narcotics control efforts: to achieve sustained reductions in the availability of illicit narcotics coming into the United States, we must bring narcotics production under control in all key growing areas simultaneously.

We said then we had a problem of excessive production—which continues today. We also have problems of insurgent control of growing areas, organized and increasingly violent opposition by traffickers, local economies dependent upon narcotics production, and increasing local demand for narcotics for internal consumption.

We had no illusions then about the effort needed to contain this problem. We have no illusions now. We also know we are making progress.

The basic requirement we faced was to establish a truly international base for narcotics control, including new and expanded programs in more source countries and more extensive involvement by the international community.

Today, while the problems of narcotics production and trafficking are extensive, we believe the United States, in cooperation with other nations, has made progress in laying that foundation for simultaneous control programs and that we have been successful in broadening the scope of international involvement. Given your study missions and knowledge of the special problems we face, I am sure the committee concurs that our diplomatic efforts and programs have come a long way in just a few years.

We note your shared belief that effective diplomacy is a key element to progress in international narcotics control. It has been through our bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts that we have achieved many of our objectives. These diplomatic efforts have involved the President, the Secretary, and other ranking U.S. officials. Recently, these efforts have been joined by the diplomatic activities of other nations, whose strong commitment is critical to achieving our objectives in international narcotics control. Achieving this broader international involvement was among our key objectives.

In addition to the valuable liaison with ministries of health, interior and justice, we have engaged the foreign ministries of other developed nations in discussions of narcotics control, and are now seeing narcotics appropriately emphasized as a matter of foreign policy—which was another of our earliest diplomatic objectives.

One consequence of our diplomatic and program efforts, which include not only our activities but the information programs of the U.S. Information Agency, is that drug abuse is no longer seen as primarily a U.S. problem. There is increased awareness in other countries of the internal damage which drug abuse and drug trafficking are causing—including rampant drug abuse among their youth, undermining of their economies, corruption, increasing violence, murder and other crime, and links between narcotics traffickers, terrorists and political insurgents. In our communications with the governments and peoples of source nations we have emphasized that drug abuse is a common burden, and this emerging awareness of that reality is a principal factor in our obtaining new and enhanced agreements on crop control. These factors have also led to increased commitments by the governments of developed nations to curb production and trafficking.

A particular objective has been increased involvement by U.N. organizations in narcotics control, and expansion of multilateral programs through U.N. agencies. Now, the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control is prepared to support coca control programs in South America, thanks in part to a 5-year $40 million donation from the Government of Italy. The Fund will also be administering a new Special Development and Enforcement Program in Pakistan which is also attracting major donor support.

While seeking increased involvement by the international community and organizations, we have also secured new bilateral agreements and enhanced existing programs.

We are pleased that the committee's report acknowledges the significant progress which has been made in key source countries. In the last 3 years, we have entered into major new agreements with Pakistan, Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Your report comments favorably on many of the accomplishments, including opium crop reduction in Pakistan, the suppression of narcotics production activities in Thailand, and the continuing commitment by the Government of Mexico to crop control.

We note the acknowledgments of the improved Colombian program in the statements by Chairman Rangel, Mr. Gilman, and others in support of the resolution passed unanimously in both Houses in May which noted the Colombians increased activity and urged an eradication program. The progress which you and other Members applauded continues; arrests and raids on cocaine laboratories have increased, and the Government has announced a new eradication program.

It is important to an understanding of the Colombian program to recognize that the Government had been escalating its activities over the last 3 years, and especially in the last year, as evidenced by the March raid at Tranquilandia which resulted in the seizure of 10 metric tons of cocaine and cocaine base.

Much of the leadership and planning had been provided by Minister of Justice Lara who was assassinated on April 30. The resolutions adopted by our Congress paid a justified tribute to Minister Lara. We are encouraged by the declarations of his successor, Minister Parejo, that the campaign will continue.

The Colombian Government has recently announced new coca and cannabis eradication programs, which we applaud. The Colombians plan to use glyphosate to aerially eradicate cannabis. The Government has also declared an expanded state of siege, and, in addition to conducting other major raids, has announced it will honor U.S. requests for extradition.

Peru has ageed to reduce the cultivation of coca over 5 years to that amount required for traditional uses, and the plan is to take 4,000 hectares out of production this year in the Upper Huallaga Valley. State and the Agency for International Development have worked with the Peruvians to overcome problems that initially delayed this program, which combines crop control with integrated rural development.

We are also working with Peru and UNFDAC to provide a major narcotics related development project in another growing area. We are also discussing the creation of additional mobile police units, and coca control activities in areas which will not receive development assistance. These activities are occurring against a backdrop of increasing violence spawned by cocaine traffickers, violence which seems to increase in Peru and elsewhere as programs expand and become more effective.

Bolivia agreed last August to a 5-year program to control coca cultivation in the Chapare region, and, while eradication and development assistance have been delayed by the necessity of establishing a police presence there, discussions are underway on control projects in the Yungas, where U.N. assistance is proposed, and other growing regions. The United States would again support the eradication efforts, including formation of additional mobile police units.

The priority which we assign to narcotics control was illustrated on June 1 and 2 by the meeting in Lima between Department officials and our Ambassadors to Peru, Boliva, Colombia, and Ecuador to discuss narcotics control strategies and problems in the Andean region.

Your report praised the "national will and commitment" of the Government and people of Mexico to eradicate illicit crops, and highlighted the impressive reduction in Mexican opium and cannabis cultivation from their high points in the middle 1970's when Mexican narcotics dominated the U.S. heroin and marijuana markets. There has been some increase in Mexican production in 1983, due in part to changes in growers' methods of operations—including selection of sites which are remote, frequently smaller and more difficult to detect—and improved weather.

We have provided, for testing in Mexico, a new type of agricultural spraying aircraft and improved spraying boom which are more flexible and more effective at both the altitudes where some new cultivation is occurring, as well as at lower, traditional levels. We have continuing discussions with Mexican officials on improving narcotics eradication and verification efforts, and are jointly planning an opium survey to improve assessments of production and control operations.

Our decision to support the acquisition and testing of a fixed-wing specialized spray aircraft and an improved spraying boom may pay dividends elsewhere. We are prepared to make this aircraft and boom available for spraying operations elsewhere in Central and South America and in Southeast Asia.

As your report noted, Thailand has conducted an effective campaign over the last several years to curb opium and heroin trafficking and to suppress heroin production along its border with Burma, losing numbers of its troops in the process. There have been recent indications of Thai interest in eradication, which we continue to

regard as a necessary component of a control strategy. The Thai have begun enforcing agreements under which we provide assistance to civilian-police-military command villages which agree to discontinue opium cultivation.

The Thai are revising a master plan for opium control, which was discussed at an informal meeting of major donor nations in February. The consensus among prospective donors was that there should be a clear linkage in this plan between development assistance programs and control objectives. The United States also obtained consensus among donors for the first time that projects funded by the United Nations should be similarly linked. These understandings among donor nations fulfill another important diplomatic objective.

We have been discussing aerial eradication with the Burmese who are willing to explore the use of herbicidal spraying to eradicate opium poppy. The United States has been providing the data the Burmese need to explore the feasibility of aerial eradication, and we anticipate detailed discussions with the Burmese on this subject over the coming weeks. We note that the Deputy Minister of Home and Religious Affairs will visit Washington next week, and is including members of this committee among his calls.

Your report notes that "production of opium has dramatically decreased" in Pakistan, and that progress has been achieved in crop control by the U.S.-assisted programs in the Malakand and Gadoon-Amazai areas. We also note your compliments on the Special Development and Enforcement Plan.

Pakistan has seen high level cooperation between State, AID, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, and we believe that the increasing participation by European and other nations in the SDEP and other activities is a direct result of meetings of chiefs of mission which were initiated by our Ambassador. Great Britain has pledged 1 million pounds and Italy has pledged $5 million to this SDEP program. Saudi Arabia has also pledged support to Pakistani narcotics programs.

We have discussed with the Pakistanis our concern that reductions in crop cultivation should be matched by efforts to suppress heroin laboratories, to interdict trafficking in opium and heroin, and to curb trafficking across the Afghan and Indian borders.

The priority which narcotics control has in our bilateral relations has been communicated by President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, and Attorney General Smith to top-ranking Pakistani officials, and discussed in detail by the Joint Commission on Narcotics formed by our governments.

Rather than repeat facts and figures on activities in these and other countries, I will refer to the Department's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, and the mid-year update which will be submitted on August 1. We have also provided answers to the questions you submitted in advance of this hearing. These reports and responses contain details on the narcotics control activities in about four dozen countries—including data on increased eradication and seizures in major source countries.

Instead, I want to offer some observations about our program, and the challenges ahead.

International narcotics control is a particularly complex problem because it involves governments in diverse areas of the globe, governments whose people are affected differently by narcotics trafficking and by drug abuse, governments with different capabilities of dealing with the challenge.

Moreover, the international narcotics strategy is dependent upon the effectiveness with which foreign governments not only engage in drug law enforcement, but are able to effect a rule of law throughout their territory.

Political will, Central Government control, and capability were key to the successes in Turkey and Mexico, but are not currently operative in many narcotics source countries. Narcotics control in some countries is more than just a question of strategies and resources but has become a test of the political and economic stability of governments.

For all these reasons and more, we have advised the Congress on many occasions that achieving control is a long-time proposition.

We are certain the committee recognizes the complexity of the challenge. There are no simple solutions. I am sure the select committee disagrees with those who offer simplistic answers to this problem. Accomplishments have been made during recent years, but the production of illicit narcotics will not be controlled overnight, or even in the short term.

Each of several growing regions has sufficient capacity to supply the U.S. market with heroin, cocaine, or marijuana. Again, to achieve substantial, lasting reductions in illicit drug availability, we must control production in all key growing regions simultaneously.

We, in cooperation with the Congress, have stimulated a more comprehensive response from other victim and donor nations, and by international organizations; we have increased awareness of the internal ravages of drug abuse among the governments and peoples of source and victim countries; we have promoted an expansion of crop control programs; we have achieved greater recognition by governments of their responsibilities under international treaties. But, we alone do not have the capacity nor the political opportunity to assure effective control programs in all growing regions.

To achieve that capability, we must have a truly global effort supported broadly throughout the international community. We and other nations must bolster these governments in their resolve to overcome this internal problem, assist their legitimate efforts to control production, and encourage an international response that assures worldwide containment of production and trafficking.

This is the agenda we have pursued.

Through patient diplomacy, that strategy is showing some success.

STATEMENT OF FRANK B. KIMBALL, COUNSELOR FOR AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman, I am Frank B. Kimball, Counselor for the Agency for International Development. It is a pleasure to appear today to update you on our efforts to reduce production of illicit narcotics overseas.

A little more than a year ago AID appeared before this committee to discuss our efforts in the antinarcotics field. The problems today are no less severe than a year ago and the solutions are no less complex. Yet, we have made progress.

AID continues to play an important role in support of the President's Federal Drug Abuse Strategy. We and State/INM work closely to coordinate our activities to ensure a proper response to the problem of narcotics cultivation in countries where we have programs.

Eliminating the production of narcotics is, in part, a development problem. Large scale cultivation of illicit drugs takes place in developing countries, usually by farmers who are extremely poor. In general, there is no one crop that can provide a viable economic alternative to those farmers who have traditionally produced narcotics. Efforts at reducing the production of narcotics are further complicated by the remoteness of the growing areas and the strength of local social and cultural traditions. In some countries the government has no control over the growing areas at all.

The Gilman amendment, section 126 of the Foreign Assistance Act, instructs AID to "give priority consideration to programs which would help reduce illicit narcotics cultivation by stimulating broader development opportunities."

We continue to evaluate our approaches to the problem of narcotics production in the developing world. We have an AID Narcotics Policy Coordinator who works with the regional bureaus to insure our program addresses the narcotics issue. We also have a new Director of Strategic Studies.

Increased interest in narcotics reduction by other donor nations in the last year is an encouraging sign. The government of Italy has pledged $40 million to the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control for narcotics control in the Andean countries. The multilateral support for the Special Development and Enforcement Plan for opium producing areas [SDEP] in Pakistan is another example that narcotics is viewed more and more as an international problem.

Development is a long-term effort and results are seldom achieved quickly. Reducing the production of narcotics requires basic changes in the economic behavior of the regions where narcotics are produced. Long-term success not only requires a commitment to that change, but the realization that it cannot be accomplished overnight.

The successful implementation of enforcement and eradication efforts is a sine qua non for the success of an alternative income effort. Prerequisites for a successful program include not only the firm commitment of the host government to suppress narcotics cultivation but also the ability to project its influence into narcotics cultivation areas. Without both of these, there is very little likelihood that U.S. assistance will result in significant reduction of illicit drug production in any given country.

Where eradication efforts are underway, AID's development expertise can provide advice on alternate crops, fertilizer, irrigation systems, and other resources to encourage enforcement of existing bans by host government authorities and accept-

ance of eradication by residents of the affected areas. The following countries are major producers of opium or coca in which AID has a presence:

PAKISTAN

Poppy cultivation takes place primarily on small plots in the Northwest Frontier Province. It is well integrated into the local society, which is resource poor, and not self-sufficient in basic food grains. Poppies are grown on marginal land and there are a few obvious crop alternatives. Providing alternative sources of income will be a major undertaking, requiring significant investment in infrastructure, institutional development and human resources.

In late fiscal year 1983 the $20 million Gadoon-Amazai Area Development project was initiated, covering approximately half the current poppy cultivation area of the country. (The project has since been amended to cover other areas of the Northwest Frontier Province. The project is not titled the Northwest Frontier Province Area Development Project. The funding level has been increased to $30 million over the life of the project.)

With this project, AID enters a new phase in its support of the poppy eradication policies of the United States and the Government of Pakistan, in which specific development programs may be directly linked to specific enforcement activities. Phase I of the NWFP project will produce immediate and highly visible benefits such as roads, potable water systems, school repairs and construction. It will also involve programs to increase production of wheat and provide seed and fertilizer to farmers. Phase II will involve long-range projects such as development of off-farm employment opportunities.

AID also assisted the Government of Pakistan in preparing a Special Development and Enforcement Plan [SDEP] for the opium producing areas for presentation at the December 1983 meeting of the Pakistan Consortium in Paris. The presentation was designed to enlist other donors in the narcotics control effort. The plan is designed to eradicate existing poppy cultivation throughout the Northwest Frontier Province and to prevent its resurgence or introduction into nonproducing areas.

At the April 1984 meeting of the Pakistan Consortium support was obtained from several other donors for the SDEP. Italy pledged $5 million to the plan, the United Kingdom 1 million pounds. AID will channel its support to the SDEP through the NWFP Area Development Project. The multilateral SDEP will be carried out under the auspices of the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control [UNFDAC]. Completion of the design of the first SDEP project is expected by late November of this year.

AID is a member of the U.S. Embassy Narcotics Coordinating Committee in Islamabad which acts to ensure responsive and coordinative U.S. efforts. We currently have "poppy" clauses in agricultural, irrigation, rural electrification, and energy projects, which prevent narcotics producers from obtaining development benefits.

The AID mission has a full time narcotics project management officer who ensures that all projects in our portfolio contribute to narcotics reduction efforts to the maximum extent possible. Finally, we have worked with and will continue to offer assistance to INM in its Malakand-area project.

THAILAND

Thailand's production of opium is 35 to 50 tons. AID administers one project in Thailand that is indirectly related to achieving narcotics reduction objectives. The Mae Chaem Watershed Development Project contains a "poppy" clause, but it is primarily designed to increase income and access to social services for the residents of the watershed in Northern Thailand. The project is also intended to reverse environmental damage to the area caused by improper use of the area's resources. The total funding level of the project is $10 million and $3.1 million remains to be obligated. It is too early to evaluate impact of the project on narcotics production from Thailand.

BOLIVIA

In Bolivia, AID is embarking on a new crop substitution effort in conjunction with an INM Eradication Program. The U.S. Government and Government of Bolivia signed the Chapare Regional Development Project in August 1983. Internal Bolivian political difficulties prevented the issuance of a decree creating the Bolivian agency responsible for narcotics-related development projects until mid-January 1984. The Secretariat for the Development of the Bolivian Tropics is now in place. However, since January it has had, and lost, two directors. This has delayed selection of staff.

Implementation (of the 5-year, $14.4 million Chapare Regional Development Project) is still delayed because the GOB has yet to re-establish authority over the Chapare region.

The development project is supplemented by $20 million in infrastructure loans targeted for the Chapare region. These loans will contain "coca" clauses to prevent benefits from flowing to coca growers.

The Chapare Regional Development Project will provide credit for both local agribusiness and to Chapare farmers cooperating with the INM-assisted coca eradication program. The availability of credit should help expand production and promote markets for commercial livestock, agricultural and forestry products from the Chapare Region.

PERU

AID and INM are engaged in an effort to reduce production of coca in the Upper Huallaga region of the Peruvian high jungle. This pilot project was the first joint effort by AID and INM. The AID Upper Huallaga Area Development Project was signed in 1981. The project is providing a wide range of services to farmers in the region including alternative crops in the region such as rice, cacao, citrus fruits, and coffee. Extension agents provide farmers with improved methods.

Qualified farmers who are not growing coca are eligible to receive agricultural credit. The project is also providing roads and potable water systems to residents of the valley. The GOP's budget constraints have resulted in a lack of counter-part funds, which in turn has slowed procurement of needed goods and services.

Over the last several months the security situation in the valley has deteriorated. The headquarters of PEAH, the AID counterpart agency has been attacked. Some farmers cooperating in the eradication effort have been killed. Despite these obstacles USAID/Peru has estimated that the AID project can still be completed by the original target date, September 30, 1985.

AID is ready to launch an important new initiative in Peru aimed at educating Peruvian opinion leaders and the public on the hazards of narcotics. The realization that narcotics production and trafficking poses a threat to the society is an important factor in obtaining a firm commitment from the government to take action. AID's new initiative will assist a local private and voluntary organization [PVO] in carrying out public education programs. These programs will examine the effects of the drug trade on the society and economy of Peru and the social costs of Peru's increasing coca paste abuse problem. The myth that the drug trade is advantageous to the producing nation must be dispelled.

We remain dedicated to reducing production of coca and in providing alternative sources of income to farmers in the region. We will continue to work with UNM to develop the most appropriate responses to the needs of the coordinated effort and to continued cooperation in achieving our shared goals.

I would be happy to answer any questions you may have at this time.

SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD

Mexico

Question 1. What steps has the Department of State taken to counter the dramatic increase in poppy cultivation and heroin production in Mexico that is entering the United States?

Answer. We have held discussions with appropriate officials concerning the recent increase in poppy cultivation. The Mexican Government acknowledges that there has been an expansion in opium poppy cultivation but has also reported a doubling of opium poppy eradication in 1983, compared to 1982. The Mexicans cite several factors which in part account for the increase in opium cultivation including: favorable growing conditions during 1983; Mexico's severe economic problems; and the traffickers more frequent use of smaller, better camouflaged fields and planting at higher altitudes to avoid effective aerial spraying. The Government of Mexico shares our concern and is developing a series of remedial actions such as improved detection techniques, introduction of a new type of aircraft to add expanded flexibility and mobility to spraying capabilities, and improved information sharing.

Question 2. Will the Department of State consider assisting the Government of Mexico in the development of the capability to survey the extent of opium and marijuana production in their territory through high altitude aircraft or satellite?

Answer. The Department of State is currently discussing the implementation of a narcotic crop survey system with the Government of Mexico.

Question 3. Does the Department of State feel that the Mexican Government has a sufficient number of Bell 206 helicopters to mount an effective poppy eradication campaign?

Answer. We are continuously assessing with the Mexican Government the adequacy of the number of spray-craft. We believe that the current number of Bell 206 helicopters is sufficient when augmented by fixed-wing specialized spray-craft and when effectively deployed.

Question 4. How does the Department of State assess narcotics enforcement cooperation between the Mexican Federal Judicial Police [MFJP] and the Drug Enforcement Administration? Are there a significant number of joint prosecutions and DEA assisted investigations in Mexico against the heroin traffic effecting the United States?

Answer. The Department of State believes that current relations between the Drug Enforcement Administration and the MFJP are excellent. DEA informs us that cooperation with MFJP has considerably improved during the past year and that consequently the number of significant bilateral investigations has increased. Since last fall a special prosecutor has been named by the Mexican Attorney General to investigate and prosecute under the joint United States-Mexican Prosecution [JANUS] Program. DEA anticipates a heavy increase in prosecutions in the coming year.

Question 5. What programs have the Department of State put in place to prevent Mexico from becoming a transit center for the smuggling of Asian and European heroin, as well as cocaine and psychotropic drugs, to the United States?

Answer. The Mexican Government has expressed concern over the increase of narcotics trafficking through Mexico, particularly of cocaine. In response, U.S. agencies have provided special technical training to assist the GOM in improving its narcotics interdiction capability. In fiscal year 1983, 55 Mexican officials were trained by DEA in a drug enforcement course, and an in-country intelligence collection and analysis school is taking place this month. A number of Mexican officials have also attended specialized narcotics training courses conducted by DEA and Customs in the United States in recent years. Discussions between Mexico and U.S. enforcement officials have taken place concerning the need for improved information sharing and cooperation along the border and our interest to establish U.S. Coast Guard-Mexican Navy cooperation off the Yucatan Peninsula. These are ongoing discussions which will improve our joint capabilities.

Peru

Question 1. The Government of Peru continues to permit, in egregious violation of the Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs of 1961, the uncontrolled production of the coca leaf beyond what is required for legitimate uses. What programs does the Department of State have in place to encourage Peru to:

(a) Establish the quantity of coca leaf that is required to meet current coca leaf chewing needs, and for its own and the international pharmaceutical and flavoring extract market;

(b) Establish the hectares needed to produce these legal coca requirements and then limit licenses to the number of growers necessary to cultivate the number of hectares needed;

(c) Progressively eliminate all other production of coca through the voluntary compliance of growers or by eradication, if necessary;

(d) Progressively eliminate the practice of coca leaf chewing by December, 1989, as required by the Single Convention Narcotic Drugs of 1961.

Answer. Under our narcotics assistance project agreements, the Peruvian Government has agreed to reduce the cultivation of coca to the amount required to meet its legitimate uses, including coca leaf chewing. In the Upper Huallaga our agreement calls for an elimination of all illicit coca cultivation over a 5-year period.

The Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture makes the determination of the demand required for traditional and other legal purposes and through ENACO, the state monopoly for coca, licenses appropriate cultivation to meet those needs. ENACO has issued no new licenses for cultivation in around 5 years, a decision reflecting the Peruvian Government's view that cultivation has long been sufficient for licit needs. The Executive President of ENACO serves as a member of the Coordinating Commission of the Upper Huallaga Special Crop Control Project and, under terms of the project agreement, assists in the implementation of that agreement.

We have been active in bringing UNFDAC into Peru to consider a major narcotics-related developmental project in another coca cultivation area. We have also initiated discussions with the Peruvian Government about a crop reduction project in other coca regions.

Our objective in supporting the Peruvian Government's antinarcotics efforts is to assist it in conforming to the requirements of the Single Convention on Narcotics. However, the Peruvians have been dealing with the International Narcotics Control Board, the monitor of the Single Convention, rather than with the United States, for advice on the matters relating to conformity with that treaty. Among the issues which have been discussed include the means by which the Peruvian Government can reduce the level of "traditional consumption" by coca chewers.

Question 2. Should U.S. assistance to Peru be contingent on that nation's development of a plan to achieve the above objectives (as per compliance with section 481 Foreign Assistance Act as amended by P.L. 98-164)?

Answer. No; the criteria for suspension of assistance should not just be contingent upon the development of a plan. Section 481 provides that if the President determines that a country has not taken adequate steps, assistance will be suspended.

Question 3. What steps has the Department of State taken to enlist the assistance of other Western nations in encouraging and supporting Peru in the reduction of coca production?

Answer. For several years a key objective of the State Department has been to encourage Western nations to support Peru in the reduction of coca. We believe that these efforts have recently produced significant results. We have raised this issue bilaterally as well as in various multilateral fora, including UNFDAC, and the CND. Such encouragement, in conjunction with an increasing cocaine abuse problem in Europe and other developed countries, has stimulated concrete interest in and the provision of financial resources for narcotics programs in Peru from a number of Western European countries.

For example, the Government of Italy has pledged $40.9 million over 5 years to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control [UNFDAC] for coca control activities in the Andean region. A team from UNFDAC is now examining the possibility of an extensive development program in the Cuzco area of Peru. The Government of Sweden has earmarked part of its UNFDAC contribution for similar coca control projects in the region. High-level interest in narcotics control in the Andean region has been expressed by the Governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and regional groups such as the EC and the Nordic Council; the latter has stationed enforcement officers in some Andean nations to improve coordination.

Question 4. What inter-American efforts has the Department of State undertaken to encourage and support Peru in the reduction of coca production?

Answer. We have attempted to work with the inter-American organizations to sensitize the governments in the region to the full range of problems associated with narcotics production, trafficking and use. For example, in 1979 we assisted the Pan American Health Organization and the Peruvian Government in organizing an international conference which demonstrated the regional problems of coca production and cocaine and coca paste use. Last year, we also assisted the Colombian Government in organizing an international conference on drug abuse awareness which included participants from several Latin American Governments as well as the international organization, the South American Accord. In 1984 we supported the establishment of a working group on narcotics in the Organization of American States as a means of focussing the attention of the member governments on regional narcotics problems. Regional meetings have been held, with U.S. support and participation, among law enforcement officials from many Latin American countries, including Peru, to urge both the reduction of narcotics cultivation and improvement of narcotics enforcement coordination.

Question 5. What is the present status of the Upper Huallaga Valley project? What plans does the State Department have to encourage coca eradication projects in other growing areas in Peru?

Answer. Peru experienced considerable project startup difficulties in the Upper Huallaga Valley during 1983 and eradicated 703 hectares of coca. The Peruvians are now applying 2,4-D herbicide to the stumps of the coca bushes, a more efficient method of eradication than uprooting the coca plants. Eradication this year is proceeding at a faster pace than 1983, and the 1984 project goal of 4000 hectares will be achieved with difficulty because of two factors: (1) an unusually heavy rainy season in the early months of the year, which impeded the eradication effort; and (2) a deteriorating security situation in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Since October of 1983, the region has experienced increasing violence, including dynamite attacks on the headquarters on both AID and INM supported eradication projects, shooting of eradication field workers, and the assassination of the mayor of Tingo Maria. In April and May, a major police effort was carried out to improve security in the Upper Huallaga, and we are hopeful security will be restored. Our summer goal during the dry season is 600 hectares a month.

We are discussing with the Peruvian Government the formation of additional UMOPAR special police units which would be deployed in other coca areas to establish a level of security to permit coca eradication operations, particularly in non-traditional cultivation areas where developmental assistance is not appropriate. UNFDAC is currently examining the possibility of initiating an extensive rural development/crop substitution program in the Cuzco area of Peru.

Bolivia

Question 1. Does the Department of State have any plans to encourage the Bolivians to undertake a comprehensive coca eradication effort in all seven coca growing areas in Bolivia, and not just the single project that is presently underway in the Chapare Region?

Answer. Yes; our program agreements call for a reduction of coca production in 5 years to the level needed for traditional uses. The first step is our project in the Chapare, which is the largest illicit production area in the country. We are simultaneously considering a combined UNFDAC rural development and INM-supported coca eradication program in the Yungas, which is the country's other major coca producing area. As soon as we have progress and a demonstrated commitment by the Bolivians to implement these projects the United States, together with the international community, will undertake programs in the remaining areas.

Question 2. How can the Department of State best assist the Government of Bolivia in establishing the quantity of coca leaf required annually by Bolivia for its legal chewing, pharmaceutical and flavoring extract market?

Answer. One of the four project agreements which the United States and the Bolivian Governments signed in August 1983 ("Control of Legal Coca") calls for the establishment of Government control over the transport and marketing of coca leaves for legitimate traditional use. Under this agreement, the Directorate for Control and Fiscalization of coca will have the overall responsibility both for controlling legal coca marketing and for determining the level of licit demand. INM will provide assistance to that Directorate for conducting studies and maintaining distribution records aimed at determining legitimate demands.

Question 3. Should U.S. assistance to Bolivia be contingent on that nation's development of a plan to eliminate the illicit production of the coca leaf (as per compliance with section 481 Foreign Assistance Act as amended by P.L. 98-164)?

Answer. No; the criteria for suspension of assistance should not just be contingent upon the development of a plan. Section 481 provides that if the President determines that a country has not taken adequate steps, assistance will be suspended.

Colombia

Question 1. The United States has been providing narcotics assistance to Colombia for over 10 years. Notwithstanding this assistance the production of coca and marijuana, the smuggling of coca paste from Bolivia and Peru into Colombia, and the illicit traffic of methaqualone in Colombia all have grown progressively worse. Can the Department of State suggest a comprehensive plan that would enable Colombia, in cooperation with other nations, to accomplish the following objectives, *(a)* to eradicate the illicit cultivation of marijuana and coca; *(b)* curtail the smuggling of coca paste and base from Bolivia and Peru; *(c)* detect and seize cocaine and methaqualone processing facilities; *(d)* suppress the traffic in these substances and disrupt the trafficking organizations; and *(e)* cooperate more fully with the United States and other nations in international narcotics control?

Answer. We believe the Colombian Government [GOC] has developed a comprehensive strategy which includes aerial eradication, strengthened interdiction and enforcement, controls on precursor chemicals, and extradition of narcotics smugglers.

Question 2. What priorities does the Department of State have concerning narcotics control initiatives with Colombia?

Answer. The Department's priorities are foremost to assist the Colombian Government's effort to eliminate cannabis and coca cultivation and secondly to support law enforcement efforts aimed at suppressing narcotics refining and trafficking and the trade in essential precursor chemicals for illicit purposes.

Question 3. What progress is being made in the extradition of Colombian nationals who have committed narcotics violations in the United States to this country for prosecution?

Answer. Substantial progress is being made in this area. A special briefing can be arranged to update members on specific steps being taken.

Question 4. In December, 1982, at the urging of Presidents Reagan and Betancur, Secretary Shultz and Colombia's Foreign Minister Lloreda was to prepare a full

plan of attack on narcotics production and trafficking in Colombia. What steps have been undertaken by the Department of State to implement this initiative?

Answer. As we have responded on previous occasions, there is a misunderstanding on the results of that meeting. The two Presidents undertook to support more rigorously efforts to control narcotics but there was no agreement to prepare some specific comprehensive plan. The State Department has been in continuous dialogue with the GOC on areas of cooperation and support for the Colombian efforts.

Question 5. What diplomatic initiatives would the Department of State recommend be taken against Colombia if they fail to prepare and implement a comprehensive plan that reduces illicit narcotics production and trafficking as per compliance with section 481 Foreign Assistance Act, as amended by Public Law 98–146?

Answer. Over the past few years, the GOC has taken substantial steps to reduce narcotics production and trafficking. Recently this effort has been accelerated, as has been recognized by the recent congressional resolution congratulating the GOC on its efforts.

We believe it would be counterproductive to anticipate that Colombia would not continue these efforts and to speculate on diplomatic initiatives which could be taken against Colombia.

Jamaica

Question 1. What programs has the Department of State undertaken to assist the Government of Jamaica in the control of marijuana cultivation in that nation?

Answer. We do not currently have a project agreement with Jamaica to control cannabis cultivation.

Question 2. What is the Department's assessment of the role played by Jamaica as a transshipment point for cocaine from Colombia destined to the United States?

Answer. Increasing evidence suggests that Jamaica in the past few years has become a significant transshipment point for cocaine but there is no valid basis for an estimate of the magnitude of that trafficking.

Question 3. Would the Department of State consider the development of a single program of agricultural, economic and narcotics control assistance of Jamaica?

Answer. The Department would be prepared to consider the development of such a program if it could be implemented in Jamaica.

Italy

Question 1. The Governments of the United States and Italy have formed a bilateral joint working group on narcotics trafficking and organized crime that is headed by Attorney General William French Smith and Italian Interior Minister Oscar Luigi Scalfaro. Would a similar type working group on international narcotics control between the Secretary of State and the Italian and other Western Foreign Ministers also be a useful group?

Answer. The Italy-United States Narcotics Working Group will deal with specific enforcement issues between our two countries. Previously, no mechanism for this existed.

With regard to exchanges between the Department of State and European Foreign Ministries an adequate mechanism is already in place.

Hong Kong

Question 1. Has the Department of State begun any initiatives with the People's Republic of China to prevent the trafficking of narcotics from the Golden Triangle, through the People's Republic, and into Hong Kong?

Answer. We have discussed this issue with PRC officials on various occasions in Beijing, in the U.S., and in international fora. This month Dr. Jiang Bing, Director of the Bureau of Drug Administration and Policy in the Ministry of Public Health, visited the U.S. to exchange views on this and other issues. The State Department recently funded a training course in China by U.S. Customs to assist the PRC in preventing the trafficking of narcotics through its territory. Both nations have agreed to expand their cooperation in international narcotics control efforts.

Question 2. Hong Kong plays a key role in international drug trafficking by serving as a major international financial and currency exchange center. Hong Kong has very lax foreign exchange controls and extremely firm bank secrecy and financial privacy laws. Easier access to banking and financing records by Hong Kong authorities would facilitate cooperative international narcotics investigations. Has the Department of State taken any steps to review its current banking and financial regulations to enhance narcotics financial investigations?

Answer. The Department of State has encouraged the Government of Hong Kong to review its banking and financial regulations to enhance narcotics financial investigations. The Consul General has been meeting with senior HKG officials to em-

phasize the importance of financial investigations and asset forfeiture in narcotics cases. Senior State Department officials have stressed these points in meetings with Hong Kong narcotics officers in Hong Kong and Washington.

A significant change in Hong Kong bank secrecy procedures occurred on June 15. Prior to that date, foreign law enforcement agencies such as DEA could not obtain information on Hong Kong bank accounts, used as repositories for narcotics profits, unless a defendant had been brought to trial. A grand jury indictment alone was not deemed sufficient. After the initiation of the trial, banking information could be obtained only on a court to court basis through letters rogatory.

As of June 15, 1984 the wording of Hong Kong's Evidence Ordinance was amended to permit foreign law enforcement agencies access to bank account information during a grand jury investigation, if the banking institution and preferably the account number have been identified. The use of the court to court procedure is still required, however.

Hong Kong's Evidence Ordinance was also amended to permit Hong Kong courts to issue "Letters of Request" to obtain evidence in other jurisdictions for use in criminal proceedings in Hong Kong. We understand that Hong Kong is also considering asset forfeiture legislation. However, this legislation has not yet been approved by the HKG.

Question 3. Has the Department of State encouraged Hong Kong to pursue regional narcotics enforcement cooperation with all the countries of Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand, Burma, and Laos?

Answer. The Department of State has encouraged Hong Kong to pursue regional narcotics enforcement cooperation with the countries of Southeast Asia. Hong Kong Customs and Chinese Customs cooperate along their common border. The U.K. has a law enforcement representative in Bangkok who provides liaison between Thai and Hong Kong enforcement agencies. Hong Kong cooperates with other countries in Asia and the Pacific, such as Singapore, Australia and the Philippines, as well as with other international enforcement agencies. DEA often assists in such cooperation. Hong Kong is a member of INTERPOL, and the HKG's Commissioner for Narcotics is an active participant in virtually all international meetings on narcotics and drug abuse. Hong Kong participated in the recent Law Asia meeting in Seoul, where narcotics legislation and enforcement were considered. Hong Kong officers have access to training provided by the Australian and U.K. governments, and officers from other Southeast Asian countries send officers to Hong Kong for training.

Question 4. What is the State Department's assessment of Hong Kong's role in the trafficking of heroin from the Golden Triangle to the United States?

Answer. Recent reporting indicates that Hong Kong is infrequently used as a transit or transshipment point for narcotics enroute from source countries to markets in Europe or North America, and that the large amount of heroin going into Hong Kong is for local consumption. However, Hong Kong is the major financial center for Southeast Asia's drug trafficking. Hong Kong-based trafficking organizations operate throughout the world. Longstanding ties between Hong Kong traffickers and sources of supply in Thailand allow Hong Kong organizations to operate on a very large scale. Large numbers of heroin trafficking ventures throughout the world are financed and controlled from Hong Kong. There is evidence that Hong Kong-base groups are involved in directing the smuggling of heroin into Europe and North America.

Thailand

Question 1. What is the status of the Thai Government's master plan to phase out opium production? This plan has been in preparation for over two years and we are informed was presented to the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its February, 1984 meeting in Vienna for donor support. We are further informed that the plan was unacceptable to the UN Commission because the plan failed to contain a firm commitment to completely phase out opium production, including that produced for use of village addicts, within a definite period of time. The Committee strongly feels that the time has come for the Government of Thailand to finalize a plan that will progressively phase out poppy production within five years; eradicating, where necessary, to end the production of opium, and to want the village opium addicts off the drug. What is the Department's view? Has the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters assisted the Thai Government in the formulation of their plan? If an acceptable plan is developed, will the United States support and donate toward it?

Answer. Our current information is that the Thai master plan is still under revision and has not been approved by the Royal Thai Government. It was not presented to the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its annual meeting in February 1984. Its basic outline, however, was discussed at an informal meeting of major

donors to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control. By consensus, that meeting decided that it would be premature to pledge assistance to Thailand in response to this plan until that plan contained a clear policy on the enforcement of the anti-opium poppy cultivation laws and explained how such enforcement would relate to development assistance programs.

The Department agrees with the Committee's opinion Thailand should progressively phase out opium poppy production in Thailand. INM was not directly involved in the formulation of the master plan; it was developed under a UNFDAC-financed contract for the Royal Thai Government. If an acceptable plan is developed the Department will recommend U.S. Government and other donor country support for it.

Question 2. The Government of Thailand has waged a successful campaign against large and sophisticated heroin laboratories along the Thai-Burmese border. However, the trafficking of opium and heroin through Thailand to the West continues at an alarming rate. What programs can the State Department suggest through both bilateral or multilateral narcotic enforcement assistance funds, as well as direct narcotics enforcement assistance, to assist the Thais in a more comprehensive campaign to halt the trafficking of opium and heroin through their nation?

Answer. As long as the considerable level of opium production occurs in Burma, trafficking through the Golden Triangle region and Thailand will be difficult to control. Nonetheless, the Thais have succeeded to a great extent in reducing the flow of essential chemicals to the refining areas, have all but eliminated the existence of heroin refineries in Thailand, and have disrupted the operations of trafficking organizations in Thailand. Our ongoing programs, in full coordination with the DEA, seek to support Thailand's efforts to improve its laws, its collection and utilization of drug trafficking intelligence, the communications capability of enforcement agencies, and interdiction operations throughout the country.

Question 3. During the Select Committee's study mission to Thailand in January we were informed that the Thai Government was discussing the possibility of enacting legislation that would provide a conspiracy law and also for the seizure and forfeiture of assets gained through drug trafficking. Does the Department of State know the status of these proposals? Has the United States assisted the development of these proposals?

Answer. The Office of the Narcotics Control Board, after consultations with both the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and representatives of the Australian Government, drafted and recently introduced into Parliament, a law authorizing prosecution for conspiracy in narcotics cases and the seizure of assets obtained through narcotics trafficking.

Question 4. What guarantees and protections has the United States obtained to insure that development aid extended to Thailand is not used to facilitate opium cultivation and heroin trafficking?

Answer. U.S. development assistance to Thailand has not significantly abetted the narcotics trade in Thailand. Most aid to Thailand has been concentrated in areas of the country which are not significant from a narcotics production standpoint. While Thailand's improved road system has arguably made it easier to transport contraband, this factor has been more than offset by the Government's improved enforcement activities, which also take advantage of the improved roads.

Burma

Question 1. What are present arms sales policies toward Burma? How can they be structured to provide the Rangoon Government increased resources and equipment to combat narcotics trafficking?

Answer. The Burmese Government purchases annually through FMS cash procedures approximately $1 million in military items from the U.S., mainly spare parts and ammunition for equipment already in the Burmese inventory. Consideration is being given to the establishment of a FMS credit program for Burma which would facilitate the Burmese Government's acquisition of additional military supplies and equipment. We believe that such a program would help the Burmese Government to combat more effectively insurgent/warlord groups, most of whom are engaged in narcotics trafficking.

Question 2. Burma has expressed a willingness to explore the use of herbicidal spraying as a poppy eradication technique. Has the State Department, in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration, provided to the Burmese Government technical, scientific, and other assistance it may need to explore the feasibility of a herbicidal aerial spray opium eradication program?

Answer. We have discussed over the years a number of options which would be available to the Government of Burma to help control its illicit opium cultivation.

Much of this discussion is ongoing and we would be pleased to discuss it in a closed session with the Committee.

Question 3. What can the foreign policy of the United States do to encourage direct and active narcotics enforcement cooperation by Burma with Thailand and Malaysia to foster more effective narcotic suppression in this region, and to stem the flow of heroin and opiate raw materials from Burma to and through those countries?

Answer. For many years the United States has encouraged closer cooperation among the Southeast Asian nations on narcotics enforcement.

Question 4. What can the State Department do, as our Nation's own initiative and through international organizations, to encourage Burma to seek the assistance of Thailand to detect and seize heroin refineries along the Thai-Burmese border?

Answer. The United States continues to urge closer cooperation between Burma and Thailand in efforts to combat narcotics trafficking in the region, and we also continue to work closely with both countries.

Question 5. Insurgency in various parts of Burma, particularly in the Shan and Kachin States is inextricably tied to narcotics trafficking. Burmese official policy is that effective narcotics control cannot be obtained until the insurgencies are brought under control. What is the State Department's response to this Burmese position? Can the United States, the United Nations, or other nations, particularly those that neighbor Burma, seek to end the problem of insurgency in the Shan and Kachin States through the negotiation process and diplomacy?

Answer. The establishment of effective control by the Burmese Government over areas contested by Shan and Kachin State insurgent groups would help to curb Burmese narcotics production and trafficking which are concentrated in those areas. Since the Burmese Government has made it clear that it regards the insurgencies as an internal problem and does not welcome foreign involvement, we do not foresee a diplomatic role for the United Nations, the United States or other countries in seeking to end them.

India

Question 1. During the Select Committee's January, 1984, study mission it received reports of a new trend in the smuggling of heroin, morphine base, and opium from Burma to India for onward smuggling to Western Europe and North America, as well as for consumption in India. Increased seizures of heroin in the United States and in Europe in cases where the smugglers began their journeys in either New Delhi or Bombay confirm this fact. What plans does the State Department have to respond to this new threat? Are there any considerations for a cooperative effort with India to address this growing problem?

Answer. U.S. concerns about trafficking through India have been stressed to appropriate Indian officials. In Burma, we are encouraging contacts between Burmese and Indian enforcement personnel to try to limit supplies of acetic anhydride proceeding from India to Burma. On June 1, 1984, Burmese police seized 150 kilos of morphine base that was apparently destined for the Indian border. Indian officials of the Ministry of Finance, which has jurisdiction over all licit production of opiates as well as illicit narcotics, have indicated to us their determination to control the illicit traffic through India.

Pakistan

Question 1. On November 18, 1983, the Government of Pakistan presented the Special Development and Enforcement Plan (SDEP) for the opium producing areas of Pakistan and invited international donor assistance to phase out opium production where it had been allowed to continue. This plan provides for ending opium production in the merged PATA districts of the Dir and Chitral, and the tribal area of the settled Mansehra District. The plan would also phase out production in two tribal area FATA areas; Bajaur and Mohaand, which are the heaviest opium producers in the tribal area. What is the State Department's opinion of the SDEP project? Will the United States be willing to support it? What are the conditions of the United States prior to making any donor commitments?

Answer. U.S. support for Pakistan's Special Development and Enforcement Plan (SDEP), conveyed through the Department of State and the U.S. Mission in Pakistan, has been made clear since the Plan was first proposed by the Government of Pakistan (GOP) in 1983. We see several advantages to a multilateral approach to elimination of remaining opium poppy production in Pakistan; first, it recognizes that Pakistan's narcotics production affects many other nations in addition to the U.S.; second, the burden of financial support for narcotics related development activities is more equitably shared; and finally, it demonstrates that Pakistan's anti-

narcotics actions are not based only on U.S. concerns. The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), will oversee implementation of the Plan. The U.S. Agency for International Development has set aside $10 million in addition to the $20 million already committed to the Gadoon/Amazai Development Project for use in additional poppy producing areas. Of this $10 million additional funds requested, $5 million has already been pledged to the SDEP, supplementing $5 million pledged by Italy and $1.5 million by the United Kingdom. These pledges will be used to support startup of project activities in Dir Subdivision. Prior to making the $5 million pledge, the U.S. received firm assurances from both the Government of Pakistan and UNFDAC that eradication would proceed with development. U.S. Mission personnel in Pakistan will participate in monitoring the projects.

Question 2. What actions does the State Department plan to encourage Pakistan to implement a program along the lines of the SDEP projects that would eliminate the remaining areas of opium production in Pakistan? Is our support for the SDEP project tied to such a further initiative by the Pakistanis?

Answer. After the completion of the SDEP, Gadoon/Amazai, and the Malakand projects, there will be no remaining large concentrations of opium production. There will be scattered pockets of opium production in the tribal areas of the Northwest Frontier Province which will not lend themselves to programs along the lines of the SDEP. They are areas not under government control. Planning will be undertaken in order to determine how the GOP will be able to achieve the common objective of eliminating this remaining opium production. Our future support to the SDEP will depend on the practical results of the plan's development/enforcement efforts rather than on additional commitments by the Government of Pakistan. While we and the Pakistani Government share the objective of eliminating all opium production in the country, it could be counter-productive to tie our support for the SDEP to a goal that the Government appears physically unable to achieve at this time, namely the total elimination of isolated pockets of poppy cultivation in remote and rugged mountain areas.

Question 3. Notwithstanding significant Pakistani efforts at reducing the production of opium within Pakistan, the nation remains a critical area through which opium and heroin, particularly that originating in Afghanistan, is sumggled to the West. Enforcement efforts by Pakistani police agencies have not been very successful in halting this traffic. Major settled areas as Karachi and Lahore are major narcotics trafficking hubs. Airports and seaports seem unrestricted avenues of narcotics smuggling. While some narcotic seizures have been commendable, the quantity and quality of arrests and prosecutions, particularly of major trafficking organizations, have been disappointing. Further, the Pakistani Government has been largely unsuccessful in controlling the opium and heroin traffic from Afghanistan through the Khyber Pass and the Khyber Agency. What initiatives are planned by the Department of State, in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration, to support and encourage enhanced drug enforcement, investigations and interdiction within Pakistan?

Answer. Pakistan has requested assistance from the international community to upgrade its law enforcement capabilities. In response to Pakistan's requests, State Department's program assistance to Pakistan's narcotics law enforcement agencies will increase substantially. Increases in commodity support will be accompanied by upgrading officer training and equipment maintenance capabilities. The Drug Enforcement Administration is also discussing with the GOP increased cooperation and support.

Question 4. What is the Department of State's estimate of the amount of hashish traffic directed at the United States from Pakistan? What programs does the Department have in place to respond to this traffic?

Answer. The NNICC estimates that in 1983 approximately 150 tons of hashish were imported into the U.S., most of which comes from Lebanon and North Africa. Although the U.S. does not have any program in Pakistan specifically geared to prevention of hashish trafficking, our overall support to Pakistan's law enforcement efforts contribute to their ability to interdict all types of narcotics traffic.

Afghanistan and Iran

Question 1. What efforts have been taken by the State Department, or can be taken by our Government to encourage cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey? Is not the Subcommission on Illicit Drug Traffic in the Near and Middle East of the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs the most conducive organ for developing effective drug enforcement in this region? Can the United States facilitate these discussions?

Answer. The United States encourages nations to cooperate on international narcotics control, and also urges neighboring countries to develop means for regional cooperation. The Subcommission in Illicit Drug Traffic in the Near and Middle East of the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) provides a forum for bringing together Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey to discuss the issue of narcotics. As a result of this cooperative effort the Subcommission issued in February 1984 a report which included a condemnation of drug trafficking and the connection of drug trafficking to arms smuggling and terrorism. The U.S. cosponsored a resolution in the February meeting of the CND which incorporated the substance of the Subcommission's report.

Turkey

Question 1. While Turkey has done a very commendable job of significantly reducing the amount of illicit opium production and heroin traffic within its borders Turkey now has emerged as a major trafficking nation as a result of the unlimited supplies of opiate raw materials entering the country via Iran. Has the State Department urged the Government of Turkey, and if so how, to exercise its leadership role on the U.N. Subcommission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East to improve mutual cooperation leading to more intensified eradication of illicit opium production, and suppression of illicit manufacture and traffic, in and from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran?

Answer. The U.S. urges nations to exercise a leadership role to improve mutual cooperation in their bilateral relationships and in multilateral fora in the area of narcotics control, particularly with those countries that are producers.

Question 2. What can the State Department do to encourage Turkish authorities to vigorously prosecute narcotics violators in Turkey on the basis of evidence that can be supplied by the United States and other western narcotic enforcement agencies?

Answer. Turkish authorities need no encouragement from the Department of State to vigorously prosecute narcotics violators apprehended within their jurisdiction. The cooperation of Turkish authorities with DEA and Interpol is excellent, and they will take prompt action on information supplied to them by cooperating agencies. Sentences for convicted narcotics violators in Turkey are generally more severe than in the United States and in most other countries.

Question 3. During the Committee's visit to Turkey in January, the Committee was concerned about the lack of significant narcotics trafficking intelligence possessed by both Turkish narcotic agencies, as well as by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration working in Turkey. What can be done to change this critical situation? What can be done to improve narcotics intelligence sharing between narcotics enforcement agencies in Turkey and other nations in the Near and Middle East?

Answer. Narcotics intelligence in Turkey, as elsewhere, can always be improved by training and increases in manpower. Within the next five years, Turkey will expand its total of narcotics specific police to 6,000 men. INM and DEA programs will continue to provide commodity and training support for this expansion, and intelligence capabilities in Turkey are expected to improve accordingly. With the expansion of the narcotics enforcement force that has already taken place, Turkish capabilities have grown substantially over the past several years. Turkish authorities are quite willing to share intelligence information with neighboring countries. For example, early in June, 1984, Turkish cooperation with Italy and a number of other countries resulted in seizure of 50 kilos of heroin from a TIR truck at Milan. In May, 1984, 8½ kilos of heroin were seized from a TIR truck in Germany, in an operation developed jointly between Turkish and German authorities. Over the past year, Turkish authorities have located and destroyed three major heroin laboratories in their territory. These operations appear to reflect good international cooperation and an improving intelligence capability.

Question 4. What is the State Department's estimate of the amount of illicit opium production and heroin conversion taking place within Turkey in 1983? Does this represent an increase over prior years?

Answer. We have no information to indicate that any illicit opium production took place in Turkey during 1983. With laboratory seizures occurring in Turkey, it is obvious that heroin conversion is still taking place within Turkish territory, mainly in the Eastern part of the country. We have no estimates of the amount of heroin that clandestine laboratories might be producing.

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